Reports alleging a partial halt in US intelligence sharing with South Korea represent the latest test of an alliance already navigating significant strain. According to multiple South Korean media sources, the United States suspended the sharing of satellite imagery related to North Korean nuclear facilities after Unification Minister Chung Dong-young publicly identified Kusong in North Korea’s North Pyongan Province as a uranium enrichment site—a location not previously acknowledged publicly by either government. Although Minister Chung indicated the information was derived from open-source materials, US officials reportedly treated the disclosure as a breach involving classified intelligence.

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and other officials have sought to downplay the implications of Chung’s remarks, and South Korean military officials confirmed that intelligence sharing surrounding recent North Korean missile launches was unaffected, suggesting any restriction may be limited to the nuclear domain.

Although any restriction in intelligence sharing on Washington’s part remains unconfirmed at the official level, the ongoing incident is still analytically significant and worth examining more closely. Whether or not the suspension occurred precisely as reported, it surfaces a structural question that has grown more pressing as the alliance adapts to new strategic realities: under what conditions is Washington prepared to limit intelligence sharing with Seoul?

That question matters independently of this specific episode, particularly given South Korea’s sustained push to develop independent surveillance capabilities and the broader recalibration underway within the US-ROK alliance. In addition to highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities regarding Seoul’s intelligence collection capabilities, the episode also serves to accelerate the political justification for greater ROK defense autonomy investments that were already well underway on military and strategic grounds.

Closing the Gap

South Korea has long relied on US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, particularly satellite-based systems, but has taken deliberate steps over the past decade to reduce that dependence. The clearest expression of this effort is the 425 Project, a long-term defense initiative completed in November 2025 with the launch of its fifth and final reconnaissance satellite.

The constellation integrates one electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) satellite with four synthetic aperture (SAR) radar satellites, providing around-the-clock monitoring regardless of weather or lighting conditions. Designed to support the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, the network is intended to provide real-time tracking of North Korean nuclear and missile activities. With all five satellites approaching full operational capability, the project will meaningfully improve South Korea’s capacity to monitor the North.

Existing ROK defense planning envisions expanding this architecture further, with approximately 60 additional small and microsatellites targeted for deployment by 2030, aimed at increasing revisit rates and reducing surveillance gaps.

Limitations

Despite these advances, the 425 constellation carries important operational constraints. The system’s integrated two-hour revisit cycle represents a meaningful improvement over previous capabilities. However, the two-hour window reflects the constellation’s combined performance across all five assets. For any individual satellite, revisit intervals are longer: SAR satellite coverage allows approximately four to six observations per day over the peninsula, implying gaps of several hours between passes for any individual asset.

The operational implications are significant. North Korea is assessed to be capable of preparing a missile launch within 30 to 40 minutes. A two-hour integrated cycle paired with significantly longer intervals for individual satellites creates periods of limited visibility that mobile platforms such as transporter-erector-launchers can exploit. In other words, persistent, multi-target surveillance across all high-priority sites simultaneously remains beyond current capacity. The 60-satellite expansion plan is specifically designed to close this gap by driving revisit times below 30 minutes, but that capability is years away.

Moreover, military officials have highlighted concerns over delays in real-time intelligence sharing with the United States, noting that during the satellite deployment phase, certain U.S. intelligence inputs were either delayed or restricted. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the Kill Chain, which depends on rapid detection, identification, and strike decisions within a compressed timeframe.

Compounding Challenges Facing the Alliance

Reduced intelligence sharing by the US in specific domains could carry tangible operational consequences for South Korea. For one, restricted access to high-sensitivity intelligence on nuclear facilities or weapons development could slow early warning timelines and complicate crisis decision-making. But the implications extend beyond operational utility. Intelligence exchange is a core mechanism for building trust, aligning threat perceptions, and enabling coordinated planning. Disruptions in this domain, even partial or temporary, carry broader consequences for alliance cohesion.

In particular, the more consequential risk lies in contingency scenarios. Washington has demonstrated a willingness to limit or withhold intelligence from allies when operational security concerns arise. In high-stakes situations, intelligence-sharing decisions could become more restrictive, not less.

For example, in the event of the US considering covert or preemptive options against North Korean nuclear infrastructure, Seoul could find itself with significantly less visibility into US decision-making than it expects. Reports of alleged contingency planning during the Trump administration in 2019, particularly a purported covert Navy Seal special operation, suggest this is not a hypothetical concern. In such scenarios, intelligence asymmetries within the alliance would widen precisely when they matter most.

Beyond Seoul, Tokyo is also taking active steps to enhance its intelligence capabilities. On April 23, Japan’s lower house passed legislation to establish a National Intelligence Council chaired by the prime minister, consolidating intelligence functions currently dispersed across various bodies. The move is being described by some analysts as “the most significant reform of the country’s intelligence architecture in the postwar era.”

As each ally enhances their autonomous intelligence structures, sustaining effective trilateral coordination will require consistent efforts at intelligence sharing to ensure that Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo are not only well-prepared to defend their own nations in a crisis scenario, but also positioned to act collectively in the interest of broader regional security.

Implications for Seoul’s Strategic Posture

The current episode should be understood less as an isolated disruption than as a politically clarifying moment within a longer strategic trend.

South Korea’s drive toward greater defense autonomy predates this incident and is grounded in military requirements that exist independently of any single intelligence-sharing dispute. Most concretely, the conditions for wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer— currently targeted to take place within President Lee Jae-myung’s term— require South Korea to demonstrate credible capabilities across a defined set of domains.

ISR could be one of the most demanding of these thresholds. Meeting the needed operational capabilities to allow for OPCON transfer requires the significant strengthening of Seoul’s intelligence capabilities, likely encompassing the ability to conduct independent surveillance and reconnaissance at a level sufficient to lead combined operations. The 425 Project and the planned small-satellite expansion are in direct service of meeting those requirements.

The ongoing challenge for Seoul will lie in pursuing greater autonomy while preserving the functional benefits and necessity of alliance integration. These objectives are not incompatible, but their alignment requires careful management.

American ISR capabilities will remain unmatched in the near term, and continued access to those capabilities will be essential for deterrence and crisis management. The short-term goal is not replacement but resilience: building the capacity to absorb disruptions without operational paralysis, while maintaining the alliance cooperation that remains central to peninsular security.

What began as a regional conflict in the Middle East is now stress testing one of Washington’s most stable Asian partnerships. The US South Korea alliance was already under strain before the first missile struck, driven largely by shifting American priorities, rising burden sharing expectations, trade tensions, and the overall unpredictability of US foreign policy. While the Iran conflict did not create these tensions, it is deepening them and increasing the pressure on Seoul to adapt.

A New Variable: Iran

The most recent issue straining the alliance stems from operational demands linked to the US war against Iran. With the conflict dragging on with no end in sight, Washington has called on allies to contribute to securing key maritime routes, including the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea has so far refrained from committing to such requests, reflecting both domestic constraints and broader strategic considerations.

Unlike its past deployment of over 3,000 troops to Iraq—conducted during a post-conflict stabilization phase—Seoul now faces requests to contribute amid an active and potentially expanding conflict. However, with North Korea’s nuclear threat remaining central to its security calculus, South Korea has limited capacity to divert military resources to a distant theater without affecting deterrence on the Peninsula.

Concerns in Seoul related to the current conflict materialized with the recent US redeployment of South Korea-based Patriot missile defense batteries and THAAD components to the Middle East. Operationally, the move raises questions about the immediate configuration of missile defense on the Peninsula.

The ongoing Iranian missile and drone strikes on Gulf states and Israel underscore the centrality of robust missile defense systems in countering adversaries with advanced strike capabilities. In the context of the Korean Peninsula—where North Korea possesses a substantial and increasingly sophisticated missile arsenal—the continued presence of systems such as THAAD remains critical to the ROK’s deterrence capabilities and overall security posture.

The asymmetric nature of the alliance has become increasingly evident: US strategic priorities will take precedence over allied security concerns.

The US move also carries political and symbolic costs beyond its defense implications. South Korea’s decision to host THAAD came at considerable expense—most visibly in the form of sustained Chinese economic retaliation. Its redeployment now lays bare an uncomfortable truth about the alliance: when US strategic priorities conflict with allied security concerns, the former will prevail.

Seoul’s concerns are reinforced by precedent. During the Iraq war, the US redeployed roughly 3,600 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq as part of a policy to shift troops to where the United States deemed them most needed. The troops never returned to the Korean Peninsula even after US troops left the country by 2011.

While no comparable decision has been announced in the current context, the possibility that US Forces Korea (USFK) could be redirected if the conflict expands introduces an additional layer of uncertainty for Seoul.

Taken together, these developments raise questions not merely about the redistribution of military assets, but about the reliability of the Trump administration’s security commitments to South Korea.

Converging Pressures

Beyond the immediate pressures of the Iran conflict, the alliance is being shaped by longer-term structural changes in US strategic thinking. Since President Donald Trump’s return to office, Washington has placed increasing emphasis on allied burden-sharing and the expectation that partners assume greater responsibility for their own defense.

This shift has been reflected in renewed disputes over defense cost-sharing, as well as broader signals that US alliances may become more conditional and transactional. At the same time, discussions about the future role of USFK have introduced additional ambiguity. There is growing speculation that USFK could be increasingly oriented toward regional contingencies, particularly those involving China, rather than being focused primarily on deterring the DPRK.

Economic and other frictions, including tariff disputes and the detention of South Korean workers in the United States, have further eroded trust. Moreover, a recent US Senate Democratic report warning that the alliance has been “deeply unsettled” as a result of Trump’s handling of the relationship suggests that these concerns are not confined to Seoul but are also recognized within Washington.

The cumulative effect of these developments is a gradual erosion of predictability. The alliance is not collapsing, nor is there an immediate crisis of commitment. If South Korea were attacked by North Korea today, it is highly unlikely Washington would simply observe and do nothing. However, the assumptions that have long underpinned the relationship—particularly the reliability of America’s defense commitment to Seoul—are becoming less certain.

Questions surrounding US priorities are likely to increasingly influence ROK security policy moving forward.

In this context, the Iran conflict serves as a catalyst rather than a cause. By drawing US attention and resources toward another theater, it highlights the extent to which American commitments must now be balanced across multiple, simultaneous hotspots. For Seoul, this raises questions not only about capability, but about prioritization: how US decision-makers weigh the Korean Peninsula relative to other strategic demands.

These dynamics are likely to influence South Korea’s strategic thinking in the coming months and years. There is already a renewed emphasis on strengthening domestic defense capabilities, with President Lee vowing last November to expedite achieving the goal of “self-reliant defense.”

Yet this shift toward greater self-reliance carries its own risks. A more militarily assertive South Korea could heighten threat perceptions in Pyongyang and contribute to a cycle of action and reaction. Increased capability does not automatically translate into increased stability, particularly in a context where signaling and perception play a central role.

North Korea, for its part, may view current developments as evidence of both US distraction and growing tensions within the alliance. In the near term, Pyongyang could seek to probe alliance cohesion through calibrated military provocations or more assertive rhetoric.

At the same time, the Iran conflict further complicates the Lee administration’s already limited prospects for diplomacy with North Korea, as it reduces the likelihood of US–DPRK engagement resuming in the near future, particularly in light of perceptions in Pyongyang that Washington carried out a preemptive strike on Iran while diplomatic negotiations were still underway.

Managing Alliance Uncertainty

For South Korea, the current moment presents a complex strategic dilemma. The US alliance remains indispensable to its security, yet it can no longer be treated as a static or fully predictable guarantee. This presents the Lee government with various challenges.

One central challenge lies in balancing alliance dependence with growing pressure for strategic autonomy. South Korea has no viable alternative to the US security umbrella, particularly in the face of North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities. At the same time, the possibility of reduced US availability in a crisis—however limited—creates incentives for Seoul to strengthen its own defense posture. Navigating this balance will be a defining task for the Lee administration.

Washington’s expectations that allies contribute to broader US military efforts, such as those in the Middle East, are likely to persist.

A second dilemma concerns the relationship between capability development and escalation risk. While expanding military capabilities may strengthen deterrence over the long term, it could also prompt more frequent North Korean provocations and raise the stakes of border incidents or military accidents. In a highly volatile environment, even limited clashes risk escalating into a cycle of reciprocal military buildup, deepening mistrust, and increased likelihood of direct confrontations, including incidents that could result in loss of life.

A third challenge involves the scope of South Korea’s alignment with US global priorities. Washington’s expectations that allies contribute to broader US military efforts—such as those in the Middle East—are likely to persist. For Seoul, however, the primary strategic priority remains stability on the Korean Peninsula. Determining the extent to which it should support US initiatives beyond its immediate region will require careful calibration.

In navigating these dilemmas, several pathways are available to the Lee administration. One approach would be selective or limited alignment: providing limited, non-combat contributions to US-led efforts in areas such as maritime security or logistics. This would allow Seoul to signal alliance commitment without significantly compromising its own defense readiness.

A second approach involves seeking greater clarity on US strategic thinking through sustained diplomatic engagement with Washington. This could include seeking more explicit understandings regarding the (evolving) role and plans concerning USFK, as well as the conditions under which key US military assets might be reallocated. Greater transparency in this area could help mitigate uncertainty, even if it does not eliminate it.

A third pathway, which is already underway, would center around the acceleration of strengthening independent military capabilities, particularly in the conventional domain. The emphasis would be on complementing, rather than replacing, the alliance. Such moves will likely be welcomed in Washington, particularly under the Trump administration, given US calls for allies to do more for their own defense.

While such steps may heighten tensions with North Korea, the shift toward a more self-reliant South Korean military posture appears increasingly unavoidable. To mitigate potential backlash, Seoul could emphasize the defensive nature of these measures through consistent public messaging while reiterating its continued openness to dialogue—something the Lee government has already been doing.

The alliance is not breaking down, but it is evolving under pressure, shaped by a more complex and contested strategic environment.

The Iran conflict is unlikely, on its own, to redefine the US–ROK alliance. However, it is accelerating a process of adjustment that was already underway. The alliance is not breaking down, but it is evolving under pressure, shaped by a more complex and contested strategic environment.

For Seoul, this evolution carries important implications. The alliance can no longer be understood as a fixed foundation upon which all aspects of national security rest. Instead, it is becoming one component—albeit a central one—within a broader and more diversified strategic framework.

Managing this transition will require a careful balance between reassurance and adaptation. The task for South Korea is not to replace the alliance, but to operate within it more flexibly, while preparing for a future in which the distribution of American power—and attention—is less predictable than in the past.

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North Korea's Succession Question | March 2026

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In Brief

• Renewed interest in Kim Ju Ae as her father’s chosen heir followed South Korea’s intelligence service assessment in February 2026 that she had entered a successor designation stage.

• Several signs support the assessment that Kim Jong Un’s daughter could be his chosen heir, such as her increasingly frequent public appearances and attendance at strategic events.

• Her sustained public visibility represents a notable departure from established North Korean succession patterns, in which formal institutional appointments historically preceded and anchored the public image-making process of the incoming leader.

• While Ju Ae’s Paektu lineage makes her an eligible successor, bloodline alone is unlikely to be sufficient to secure her position as North Korea’s next leader.

• Kim Jong Un’s broader elevation of women to senior positions, combined with his public remarks on women’s role in the state’s future, could signal a deliberate effort to shift elite and societal expectations in ways that could ease the path for a female successor.

• Kim Yo Jong remains the most institutionally credible alternative successor, whether as a primary successor or a transitional figure should Kim Jong Un die or become incapacitated in the near future.

• The clearest confirmation of Ju Ae being chosen as heir would be her formal appointment to senior party or military positions.

• Given her age, such appointments are unlikely before she reaches adulthood, meaning the succession question may remain unresolved for years to come.

North Korea’s reaction to the recent U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran was swift and unambiguous. On Feb. 1, the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attacks as “the most despicable form of violation of sovereignty in their nature from A to Z,” accusing Washington and Tel Aviv of placing domestic law above international law and abusing military force to advance “selfish and hegemonic ambition.”

The statement followed U.S. and Israeli strikes on what they described as key Iranian political and military facilities, including an attack that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The language used by Pyongyang was consistent with its long-standing opposition to U.S. military interventions abroad. But the timing and broader context matter.

The condemnation came only days after Kim Jong Un publicly signaled that he would be open to resuming dialogue with Washington—provided that the United States recognizes the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state and abandons its objective of denuclearization.

Yet, resuming diplomacy seems a distant goal amidst the rapidly deteriorating geopolitical situation.

From Pyongyang’s vantage point, developments in Iran reinforce two enduring conclusions about the United States.

First, that Washington’s diplomatic overtures can coexist with the preparation for military action.

Despite public indications that progress was being made in ongoing talks about Iran’s nuclear program, the Trump administration went ahead with preemptive military strikes. The move calls into question the U.S.’ intentions from the beginning: did diplomacy ever have a chance or was the decision to take military action a foregone conclusion? The attacks against Iran under such circumstances are likely to deepen skepticism within the North Korean leadership about U.S. negotiating intentions.

Second, the events in Iran reaffirm Pyongyang’s belief in the necessity of nuclear deterrence. At the recent Workers’ Party Congress, Kim declared that the DPRK’s status as a nuclear weapons state is “irreversible and permanent,” and that dismantlement “can never happen unless the whole world changes.” For a regime that has long justified its nuclear program as a shield against regime change, the images emerging from Tehran serve as yet the latest illustration of vulnerability in the absence of credible deterrence.

North Korean strategic thinking is heavily shaped by historical precedent. The fates of leaders like Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Nicolás Maduro, and now Ayatollah Ali Khamenei all serve as striking examples of what could happen to the North Korean leadership were they to relinquish their nuclear weapons.

In this sense, the Iran episode is unlikely to moderate North Korea’s posture. Rather, it consolidates a worldview already embedded in state doctrine: that security must be self-generated, nuclear weapons are non-negotiable, and that external assurances are inherently unreliable.

North Korea is not Iran

Even though the Trump administration has shown an appetite for punishing or even doing away with foreign leaders it doesn’t see eye to eye with, the plausibility of an “Iran-style” strike against North Korea remains low for several reasons.

First and most fundamentally, North Korea possesses a relatively mature and diversified nuclear arsenal. Unlike Iran, which has long hovered near the nuclear threshold without crossing it, the DPRK has a fully developed nuclear program. Any preemptive strike would carry the immediate risk of retaliation not only against U.S. forces but also against Seoul and potentially Tokyo—both treaty allies of the United States.

Second, escalation dynamics on the Korean Peninsula are qualitatively different. A U.S. strike against North Korea would almost certainly trigger rapid military responses. The proximity of Seoul to the Demilitarized Zone, combined with North Korea’s conventional artillery capabilities, means that even limited conflict could result in significant civilian casualties within hours. The risk of nuclear escalation would further complicate crisis management.

Third, North Korea’s security environment now includes formalized defense relationships with not just China, but also Russia. While the precise operational implications of the 2024 mutual defense treaty remain subject to interpretation, they introduce additional complex variables that must be seriously considered.

Fourth, South Korea’s current administration would not support any kind of military action against the North, regardless of Pyongyang’s harsh rhetoric toward Seoul. President Lee Jae-myung has prioritized de-escalation and risk reduction. It is difficult to envision Seoul endorsing a first strike absent clear and imminent threat indicators, particularly given the catastrophic consequences for the South in any retaliatory scenario.

Fifth, the absence of ongoing diplomatic engagement between Washington and Pyongyang complicates the political justification for military action. In the Iranian case, the United States framed its strikes within the context of perceived failed negotiations. On the Korean Peninsula, talks have not resumed in any meaningful form. Launching a strike without first attempting renewed diplomacy would face significant international scrutiny.

Finally, U.S. military capacity is already stretched across multiple theaters, including support for Ukraine, commitments in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, and the ongoing “war on drugs” in Latin America. Having to uphold an additional front would entail substantial logistical, political, economic, and security costs.

For these reasons, a direct parallel between Iran and North Korea overstates the immediacy of military risk on the Peninsula. Still, even if the probability of a strike is low, the perception that Trump is willing to resort to force despite diplomatic options will strongly influence Pyongyang’s strategic calculus for the remainder of Trump’s time in office, and likely beyond.

Preventing an Avoidable War

The United States faces a crowded strategic agenda. Continued support for Ukraine, energy and political considerations in Venezuela, domestic polarization tied to immigration policy, upcoming midterm elections, and the prospect of prolonged instability in the Middle East all compete for attention and resources. Adding a major crisis in Northeast Asia would significantly strain U.S. capacity and alliance management.

At the same time, North Korea has effectively closed the door to dialogue with Seoul, declaring at its recent Party Congress that it has no interest in engagement with the South. This leaves Washington as the only viable channel for de-escalation. Absent U.S.–DPRK diplomacy, the Peninsula is likely to remain in a state of high military tension, which could quickly escalate into a conflict pulling in multiple major powers.

Resuming talks, however, would require a reassessment of long-standing U.S. objectives. The strategic environment of 2026 differs markedly from that of previous diplomatic windows. North Korea has entrenched its nuclear status constitutionally. Inter-Korean relations are at their lowest point in decades. Pyongyang has expanded its external partnerships. And additional nuclear weapons development along with strengthening conventional military capacity all feature prominently on the five-year plan discussed at last week’s Congress.

Washington therefore faces a set of difficult trade-offs. Simply reiterating openness to dialogue without adjusting core demands is unlikely to bring Pyongyang back to the table. Accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, on the other hand, could lead to an arms race, be seen as legitimizing authoritarian regimes, and strain alliances with Seoul and Tokyo. Doing nothing risks further deepening North Korea–Russia military cooperation, continued proliferation activities, and diminishing leverage over time.

For now, the pathway with the most realistic chance for success involves a shift away from calls for denuclearization and unification toward a strategy prioritizing coexistence and arms control.

To this point, in a May 2025 piece, Frank Aum and Ankit Panda argued for pursuing “stable coexistence” with North Korea, defined as “largely normal bilateral relations consisting of low military hostility and regular engagement aimed at reducing security risks and tensions, improving diplomatic ties, enhancing economic trade and welfare, and facilitating dialogue and collaboration related to humanitarian, human rights, and people-to-people matters.”

The core proposition is straightforward: to reduce the risk of conflict, the United States must accept that it will need to coexist with a nuclear-armed North Korea for the foreseeable future.

Such an approach would not imply endorsement of North Korea’s weapons program. Rather, it would prioritize crisis management, transparency measures, and incremental constraints over maximalist objectives that have thus far proven unattainable. Arms control mechanisms, communication hotlines, and confidence-building steps could help stabilize deterrence dynamics even in the absence of denuclearization.

However, the clock is ticking.

The events in Iran will likely harden Pyongyang’s resolve, not soften it.

The path to peace on the Korean Peninsula will be far from linear or straightforward. The complexities involving a nuclear-armed power mean the stakes are much higher, but so is the urgency.

Ultimately, preventing an avoidable war involving North Korea will require a strategy grounded in present realities rather than past frameworks. The alternative—continued stalemate amid expanding arsenals and disappearing communication channels—could carry fatal consequences far beyond the two Koreas.

The Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), held from Feb. 19-25, has produced the most explicit articulation to date of North Korea’s position toward South Korea.

Speaking at the Congress, Kim Jong Un declared that the DPRK “has nothing to discuss with the ROK, the most hostile entity, and will exclude the ROK from the category of compatriots forever.” He further stated that the shift in policy is “not a temporary tactical measure but a historic option for defending our national interests and national prestige,” adding that unification is “utterly impossible.”

The significance of these remarks stems not so much from their tone, which has been following an increasingly recognizable pattern since 2020, but from the context in which they were made. A party congress is the DPRK’s highest decision-making body and is intended to establish policy lines for the coming five-year period.

Although North Korea had pointed to a constitutional amendment in 2024 designating the ROK as a “hostile state,” details remain elusive. But if any ambiguity surrounding the North’s true position toward the South remained before, it has now been dispelled. The language Kim Jong Un chose at the Congress is the clearest signal yet that the breakdown in inter-Korean relations is not a temporary condition.

North Korea is no longer presenting hostility toward Seoul as contingent on policy disagreements or reversible under improved conditions. Instead, it is consolidating a two-state framework at the level of party and state strategy.

The language used at the Congress suggests that the DPRK seeks to reduce ambiguity about its long-term posture and align its political doctrine with what it views as the enduring realities of the security environment.

The report reinforced this posture by citing recent South Korean drone incursions as evidence that the ROK “is not a neighbor which can be trusted and can co-exist.” Despite the current Lee Jae-myung administration’s efforts at engagement, the South Korean president’s overtures were dismissed as “a clumsy deceptive farce.”

Taken together, the statements suggest that Pyongyang is codifying a sustained hostile two-state framework and intends to anchor its inter-Korean policy in long-term separation rather than short-term tactical adjustment.

Drivers of Strategic Consolidation

The Congress marks the culmination of a reassessment that has likely been underway since the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit between Kim Jong Un and then-U.S. President Donald Trump. That episode appears to have reinforced Pyongyang’s conclusion that Seoul lacks meaningful influence over Washington’s negotiating positions and cannot function as an effective intermediary capable of securing terms favorable to the North in negotiations with the United States.

During the 2018–2019 diplomatic window, South Korea positioned itself as a facilitator between Washington and Pyongyang. The breakdown at Hanoi, however, exposed the limits of that mediation. From the DPRK’s perspective, engagement with Seoul did not translate into flexibility on sanctions relief or adjustments to U.S. denuclearization demands.

Subsequent developments have reinforced this trajectory of a breakdown in inter-Korean relations. In 2020, North Korea demolished the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong. In 2023, Kim Jong Un announced the abandonment of the decades-long goal of reunification. Other incidents—including balloon campaigns, growing North Korea-Russia military cooperation, U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, ROK military policy, and drone incursions— further strained relations.

North Korea’s evolving external environment has also reduced incentives for accommodation. Continued advances in nuclear and missile capabilities have strengthened its deterrent posture. Expanded military and economic cooperation with Russia, particularly since 2022, has diversified Pyongyang’s external partnerships.

From Pyongyang’s vantage point, these developments increase strategic autonomy. If the leadership assesses that it can secure economic assistance, diplomatic space, and security gains through channels other than Seoul, the rationale for inter-Korean engagement diminishes. The Congress language reflects a judgment that South Korea does not offer unique leverage or indispensable benefits.

The consolidation of a hostile two-state doctrine therefore appears rooted in both accumulated distrust and structural recalculation. By institutionalizing this position at the Party Congress level, Pyongyang reduces the likelihood that future engagement with Seoul will be pursued absent fundamental changes in the external environment.

Hostile Coexistence

South Korea’s government responded to the Congress by reaffirming its commitment to peaceful coexistence. President Lee acknowledged the “very hostile rhetoric and distrust” expressed by Pyongyang but stated that Seoul would continue to pursue engagement and avoid confrontation. The Ministry of Unification similarly indicated that it would not be deterred by North Korea’s stance.

Yet peaceful coexistence presupposes at least minimal channels of communication. The DPRK’s Congress signals that such channels are not presently available on its terms. As a result, the Peninsula appears to be moving toward long-term political separation combined with high-intensity deterrence and limited crisis-management mechanisms.

The erosion of the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) has already removed important risk-reduction measures along the demarcation line. The Congress’s emphasis on fortifying the southern border and reinforcing alert systems suggests that North Korea intends to deepen its defensive posture. In the absence of active inter-Korean communication, even relatively minor incidents could carry heightened escalation risk.

This trajectory is more accurately described as unstable deterrence without communication rather than stable coexistence.

The prospects for reversal appear limited under current conditions. For North Korea to reconsider its position toward the ROK, the latter would have to start by publicly abandoning the goal of denuclearization and recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear state. For the Lee administration, such a shift is likely to be politically and strategically untenable.

A future conservative administration might be more inclined to reassess aspects of inter-Korean policy, including how unification is framed in practice. However, the ROK Constitution mandates the pursuit of peaceful reunification. Any substantial move toward a normalized two-state framework would likely require constitutional revision, a politically demanding and polarizing undertaking. Given that South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term, few would be likely to expend political capital on such structural change.

A Permanent Shift?

Absent constitutional reform or a dramatic shift in the broader geopolitical environment, the most plausible medium-term outcome is consolidation of a hostile two-state reality: minimal diplomatic engagement, sustained military tensions, and continued strategic competition. While tactical adjustments may occur in response to specific developments, the explicit wording used at the WPK Congress reduces the likelihood that inter-Korean relations will revert to the engagement model seen in 2018.

The Ninth Party Congress therefore marks not merely another downturn in relations, but the formalization of a durable strategic shift in how the DPRK defines and manages its relationship with the South. By declaring permanence at the highest institutional level, Pyongyang signals that its current posture is intended to structure policy for years rather than months.

For policymakers in Seoul and Washington, this raises the threshold for engagement and increases the importance of crisis-management mechanisms, even in the absence of broader diplomatic progress.

Although Kim has effectively foreclosed diplomacy with Seoul, he has not entirely ruled out engagement with Washington. In his remarks at the Congress, he criticized the United States’ continued “hostile” posture and the broader implications of its “America First” policies, yet left open the possibility for dialogue.

The conditions attached to such talks, however, remain stringent. Pyongyang has made clear that any meaningful engagement would require the United States to recognize the DPRK as a nuclear state and abandon its long-standing objective of denuclearization— demands that will be difficult for Washington to accept in the near term.

Nonetheless, if there is any pathway to easing tensions on the Peninsula and preventing further deterioration in inter-Korean relations, it is more likely to emerge from renewed U.S.–DPRK diplomacy than from direct North–South engagement under current conditions.

A notable shift in tone emerged from Pyongyang on Thursday, as Kim Yo Jong publicly expressed appreciation for South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s acknowledgment of recent drone incursions into North Korean airspace and his pledge to prevent their recurrence.

“I highly appreciate that Jong Tong Yong, minister of Unification of the ROK, officially acknowledged the ROK-born drone’s provocative intrusion into the airspace of our country, expressing regret once again and willingness to prevent reoccurrence on February 18,” she said.

“Terrible consequences will be entailed if such violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK reoccurs, no matter whom the mastermind is and by what means it is carried out. I stress this once again. This is not a threat but a strong warning,” she added. She also noted that the North would take steps to increase vigilance along the border with the South.

The backdrop is a series of alleged drone incursions by the South. In January, Pyongyang accused Seoul of sending surveillance-equipped drones into its territory in September and again on January 4. In response, the South Korean government launched an official investigation, with Unification Minister Chung stating on Feb. 18 that Seoul would seek to reinstate a no-fly zone over the inter-Korean border under the now-suspended 2018 military agreement aimed at easing tensions.

Reading Between the Lines

At first glance, Kim Yo Jong’s remarks appear consistent with Pyongyang’s hardened rhetoric toward the South, which it continues to label a hostile state. There was no overt expression of interest in dialogue or in any kind of engagement.

Yet, the very act of publicly acknowledging Seoul’s apology and preventive steps is significant. The North did not have to respond. It could have ignored the South’s statements or continued to frame the incident solely as a hostile provocation. Instead, it chose to note and “highly appreciate” the pledge to prevent recurrence.

This matters in two ways. First, it suggests that the Lee administration’s stated intention to reduce tensions and prevent further drone incidents is being registered positively in Pyongyang—and that this acknowledgment is being conveyed publicly. Second, the North’s emphasis on heightened vigilance along the border can be read not only as deterrent messaging, but also as an attempt to prevent unintended military clashes stemming from potential airspace violations.

It is easy to dismiss the phrase “This is not a threat but a strong warning” as a veiled threat. However, under international law, a drone entering the airspace of another state without that state’s explicit prior consent constitutes a violation of sovereignty. In this vein, North Korea had multiple opportunities to retaliate militarily in response to the drone incursions. But it did not.

That restraint, coupled with a calibrated response to Seoul’s apology, suggests that Pyongyang is not seeking direct military confrontation with the South but prefers managing such delicate incidents within a contained framework over escalating them into broader crises.

What Comes Next

Still, it is too early to interpret Kim Yo Jong’s statement as a broader shift toward engagement. Whether this episode signals tactical de-escalation or the beginnings of limited re-engagement may become clearer after the upcoming North Korean 9th Workers’ Party Congress, likely to take place later this month.

Statements by DPRK leader Kim Jong Un at the Congress could clarify whether Pyongyang intends to maintain its current hardline, no-dialogue posture toward Seoul or make room for narrowly defined contact.

For now, Pyongyang appears to be managing the relationship with Seoul on its own terms: firm enough to deter, measured enough to avoid escalation, yet ambiguous enough to preserve its options.

The U.S. Department of War released its 2026 National Defense Strategy on January 23. For the Korean Peninsula, it signals continuity in alliance cooperation but a meaningful shift in the balance of responsibility, with implications for deterrence posture, alliance politics, and Seoul’s strategic choices.

The NDS states that the United States will prioritize “strengthening incentives for allies and partners to take primary responsibility for their own defense” in Europe, the Middle East, and explicitly on the Korean Peninsula, with U.S. forces providing “critical but limited support.” The document underscores that U.S. cooperation will be prioritized with “model allies”—those spending adequately on defense and “visibly doing more against threats in their regions.”

Responsibility on Seoul

Under the new NDS and the Trump administration’s defense priorities, South Korea is expected to step up and strengthen its national defense capabilities to take the lead in addressing North Korea’s conventional threats. The NDS reference to “critical” U.S. support signals continued American commitment to extended deterrence, including nuclear capabilities—a pledge the Trump administration officially reaffirmed in last year’s joint fact sheet on bilateral security and trade agreements.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung was quick to respond to the new NDS. “In the midst of an unstable international security situation, achieving self-reliant defense is the most basic of basics,” Lee wrote on X. Seoul is already moving in this direction, with the White House announcing last November that “South Korea will promptly increase its defense spending to 3.5% of GDP and purchase US$25 billion worth of military equipment from the U.S.”

In addition, Seoul seeks to achieve handover of wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington to Seoul within Lee’s five-year term. The Trump administration’s call for allies to take greater responsibility for their defense could further create momentum for both countries to revisit the OPCON issue with renewed urgency.

The NDS language on "updating U.S. force posture" also signals potential changes to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)'s role and orientation as part of ongoing "alliance modernization" talks. This realignment could create friction, as Washington prioritizes containing China while Seoul views North Korea as its primary security concern.

Delicate Balance

Seoul must now satisfy Washington's burden-sharing expectations through expanded military capabilities while reassuring its public that U.S. security guarantees remain credible—a complex challenge that could fuel calls for stronger conventional forces and renewed discussion of indigenous nuclear options.

Beyond the bilateral relationship, perceptions of diminished U.S. commitment may push Seoul toward closer ties with Japan, especially in terms of military cooperation and intelligence sharing.

The convergence of U.S. burden-sharing demands, Seoul’s military enhancement efforts, and potential deeper cooperation with Japan could also complicate Seoul’s fragile ties with Beijing, even as President Lee seeks to improve the bilateral relationship.

Opening for U.S.-DPRK Diplomacy?

Notably, the 2026 NDS makes no mention of North Korean denuclearization. The National Security Strategy released by the White House in December similarly omitted this long-standing objective.

This absence may be deliberate: removing denuclearization language could give Trump a greater chance at restarting stalled diplomacy with North Korea. With Trump expected to visit China in April, the omission may reflect an effort to preserve diplomatic flexibility and avoid rhetoric that could complicate potential outreach to Pyongyang.

For Seoul, however, this restraint is double-edged. While it may facilitate U.S.-DPRK engagement, it also underscores Seoul’s predicament: increased defense responsibilities without corresponding diplomatic leverage, particularly given Pyongyang’s continued refusal to engage Seoul directly.

In brief, the 2026 NDS redefines Seoul's strategic position by expecting it to assume greater responsibility for its own defense while navigating an evolving alliance framework and potential shifts in Washington's approach to dealing with North Korea. How effectively Seoul translates these pressures into concrete policy—while managing relations with Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington—will determine not only Peninsula stability but also the broader reconfiguration of Northeast Asian security dynamics.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s January 2026 visit to China, the first by a South Korean leader since 2019, was seen as an opportunity to explore whether Beijing might play a more active role in easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Lee, who has consistently called for greater engagement with North Korea, reportedly requested Chinese assistance on the matter during the latest talks with President Xi Jinping. China’s response, however, has been measured and carefully restrained. This approach reflects a strategic posture shaped by experience, structural limits, and a clear-eyed assessment of Beijing’s actual leverage and risks in 2026.

The most concise expression of this posture came on January 7, 2026, when China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked whether Beijing would urge North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile activities. The spokesperson replied that maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula is in the common interest of all parties and that China will “play a constructive role in its own way.” The phrasing was deliberate. It reaffirmed China’s sense of responsibility while preserving flexibility in how, when, and to what extent Beijing chooses to involve itself. It also avoided any suggestion of public pressure on Pyongyang, which Beijing knows would likely do more harm than good.

This approach is consistent with China’s response to North Korea’s missile launches in October 2025. Rather than focusing on the specifics of the test, the Foreign Ministry emphasized that China’s Peninsula policy is “continuous and stable” and declined to add further comment. The message was subtle but clear: Beijing does not intend to let episodic tensions dictate abrupt policy shifts. Continuity and predictability, from China’s perspective, are themselves stabilizing forces.

Together, these and similar statements offer a glimpse to how Beijing is likely to approach the Peninsula in 2026.

Instead, it will focus on preserving stability, maintaining working relationships with all parties, and ensuring that its long-term interests and limited but still meaningful influence are not eroded by miscalculation or overreach.

This cautious posture becomes more understandable when placed in historical context. Over the past decade, China’s role in Korean Peninsula affairs has gradually become more constrained. During earlier periods, especially in the 2000s and early 2010s, Beijing was an indispensable convening power in multilateral diplomacy involving North Korea. That position has evolved. International sanctions, repeated diplomatic breakdowns, and changing regional alignments have all reduced the scope for any single actor to shape outcomes.

The period from 2022 to 2025 was particularly challenging. The conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea placed heavy emphasis on deterrence, U.S.–ROK alliance coordination, and trilateral cooperation with Japan. This naturally left less space for Chinese diplomatic initiatives, and Beijing’s influence in Seoul declined accordingly. At the same time, the broader strategic environment was shifting in ways that further complicated China’s position.

The most significant change came from the deepening relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. North Korea’s provision of military support to Russia created a new channel of strategic and economic resources for Pyongyang, reducing its dependence on China (more in political/diplomatic rather than economic terms) and giving it greater room for maneuver. From Beijing’s point of view, this was not an ideal development, but it was also a reality that had to be managed carefully. Attempts to reassert influence through pressure risked pushing North Korea further away at a time when China’s broader strategic environment was already becoming more complex.

Even the symbolic relationship between China and North Korea reflected these shifts. The year 2024, which marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties, was celebrated far more modestly than past milestones, with Pyongyang devoting more visible attention to its ties with Russia.

China’s response was patient and forward-looking rather than confrontational. By inviting Kim Jong Un to attend the 2025 Victory Parade and sending Premier Li Qiang to Pyongyang later that year, Beijing signaled that it still regarded the relationship as strategically important and worth stabilizing, despite the rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

North Korea’s own policy adjustments have further narrowed the scope for external mediation. Kim Jong Un’s move to abandon the goal of unification followed by his decision to redefine South Korea as a ”hostile state” in North Korea’s constitution fundamentally altered the political framework of inter-Korean relations.

From Beijing’s perspective, this shift made the diplomatic environment more rigid and more difficult to navigate, reinforcing a general sense of diplomatic inertia on the Peninsula.

Against this more restrictive backdrop, Lee Jae-myung’s election in South Korea has created a more favorable diplomatic atmosphere for Beijing. Lee’s emphasis on engagement and his desire to stabilize relations with China align well with Beijing’s own preference for reducing regional tensions.

However, a more favorable political climate does not automatically translate into greater practical leverage. Even if China wished to take on a more active mediating role, the absence of a functioning U.S.–DPRK dialogue track and the structural changes in Pyongyang’s external relationships limit what any outside actor can realistically achieve. In this context, Beijing’s choice to avoid calling for or supporting overly ambitious diplomatic initiatives appears less like passivity and more like strategic realism.

Looking ahead to 2026, four priorities are likely to define China’s approach with regard to North Korea.

First, preventing instability and escalation will remain paramount. From Beijing’s perspective, a crisis or conflict on the Peninsula would directly threaten China’s own security and economic environment. This explains the consistent emphasis on calm, restraint, and dialogue, as well as the reluctance to amplify tensions through sharp public statements.

Second, preserving China’s remaining influence in Pyongyang will be an important, if understated, objective. In a context where North Korea now has more diversified external partnerships, China has strong incentives to avoid actions that might accelerate diplomatic drift. This is one reason Beijing avoids public pressure campaigns, which could be emotionally satisfying to outside observers but are unlikely to produce compliance and could weaken long-term influence.

Third, maintaining balanced relations with both Koreas will continue to shape Chinese diplomacy. Improving ties with Seoul under Lee Jae-myung helps stabilize China’s regional environment. At the same time, keeping the China–DPRK relationship on a stable footing preserves a strategic buffer and ensures that Beijing retains a voice in any future Peninsula discussions.

Fourth, remaining alert to any opening in U.S.–DPRK diplomacy and being prepared to quietly facilitate its resumption is likely to remain an important objective. Beijing has long judged direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang as crucial to addressing the Peninsula’s core security dilemma and producing even a temporary period of stability. In the past, China played a leading role in hosting and shaping the Six-Party Talks, and during Donald Trump’s first term it consistently supported U.S.–DPRK engagement. In 2026, China is likely to position itself to play a similar, low-profile supportive role, if diplomatic progress is made between Kim and Xi, in the belief that even limited agreements could meaningfully reduce tensions and improve longer-term stability.

Notably absent from this list is a goal to push for the denuclearization of the DPRK. Recently, Chinese official statements and documents have been referring less and less frequently to North Korean denuclearization, and the issue was notably absent from the public readouts of the recent Xi–Lee meeting.

This rhetorical adjustment suggests that Beijing increasingly views denuclearization as extremely difficult to achieve in the near term. Under these circumstances, China is likely to prioritize preserving stability and preventing a rise in regional tensions over expending significant political and diplomatic capital on an objective that could strain its relations with Pyongyang, risk provoking counterproductive reactions from Kim Jong Un, and potentially further erode China’s already constrained influence over North Korea.

In short, China is unlikely to emerge as a dramatic broker of breakthroughs on the Korean Peninsula this year. Instead, it will want to act as a stabilizing presence, a strategic balancer, and a quiet advocate of dialogue.

The most probable trajectory, therefore, is not one of bold initiatives or sudden shifts, but of strategic continuity: steady engagement with both Koreas, careful management of ties with Pyongyang in an era of growing Russian influence, and persistent, if understated, efforts to keep the Peninsula from becoming another uncontrollable fault line in an already strained regional order.

President Lee advocates for what he calls a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy, but since taking office in June, his administration has struggled to translate this vision into coherent action, especially with regards to North Korea.

Rather than pragmatism, the result has been strategic disarray. While Lee champions dialogue and exchange with Pyongyang, his defense minister boasts that South Korea’s planned nuclear submarine will keep Kim Jong Un awake at night. Cabinet ministers now routinely contradict one another in public, with the latest example being the Unification Minister’s calls to scale back joint drills, leading to further incoherence among government officials.

The South Korean leader may genuinely desire improved relations with North Korea, but achieving this goal likely requires focusing on less, not more. If he cannot reconcile these internal contradictions and align his government behind a unified strategy on the DPRK, he risks creating a paralyzed foreign policy apparatus—one unable to respond effectively during crises, vulnerable to exploitation by adversaries, and ultimately incapable of advancing any of Seoul’s long-term national interests.

Engagement vs. Military Buildup

Lee’s approach to North Korea centers on his END initiative—aimed at exchange with the North, normalization of inter-Korean relations, and denuclearization. Yet some analysts have dismissed it as “a static blueprint” rather than “a dynamic tool responsive to changing conditions.”

As part of his efforts to revive diplomacy with the North and improve inter-Korean ties, Lee has floated ambitious proposals to expand engagement across multiple sectors, including plans to install new bureaus to oversee inter-Korean economic cooperation projects and ongoing discussions on permitting South Korean tourism to North Korea. He has also vowed to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) of the ROK military within his term, a move that would likely be received favorably in Pyongyang if achieved.

Lee has also tried to position himself as a facilitator of US-DPRK dialogue. During his first summit with Trump in August, he urged the American president to play a peacemaker role on the peninsula. He repeated this appeal leading up to Trump’s visit to South Korea for the APEC summit, hoping to broker a Trump-Kim meeting. Though the encounter failed to materialize, Lee has maintained public optimism about future engagement.

US-ROK joint exercises have continued unabated—drills that Pyongyang invariably denounces as “invasion” rehearsals and “war games.” Lee has also agreed to substantially increase defense spending, with next year’s budget allocating 8.9 trillion won (up 22.3 percent from this year) to strengthen the three-axis defense structure aimed at countering DPRK threats: the Korea Air and Missile Defense system, the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation system. Defense research and development will also receive 5.9 trillion won in funding.

Perhaps most controversial is the administration’s plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine. Following his summit with Lee last month, President Trump gave his seal of approval for the project, raising questions about how this plan will affect not just inter-Korean relations, but also any prospects for the resumption of US-DPRK dialogue.

The move is also in direct conflict with the Lee administration’s stated goals of mending ties with China, since the latter is likely to see the submarine move as a major point of contention.

While implementation details remain undisclosed, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back declared last week that Kim Jong Un “will lose sleep” over the prospect of South Korea having a nuclear submarine, adding that it “would surely send chills down his spine.” Such bellicose rhetoric may project strength domestically, but it directly undermines Lee’s stated goals to improve ties with Pyongyang.

On the other hand, last week, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young suggested that scaling down joint military exercises might be necessary to create conditions for renewed US-North Korea diplomacy. The comments immediately sparked controversy, prompting the ministry’s spokesperson to clarify that Chung’s remarks should be understood “as reflecting the broader significance of the ROK-U.S. joint exercises,” offering no further details.

This is not the first time the Unification Minister’s comments have raised eyebrows. When Chung took office in July, he recommended scaling down the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise despite preparations being nearly complete, puzzling military officials. In September, he suggested halting live-fire exercises along the border. Defense Minister Ahn promptly rejected the idea, stating “We cannot unilaterally stop the exercises unless the other side [North Korea] does it first.”

The disagreements reached a crescendo that same month when Chung stated that the government should recognize “the two Koreas are separate states in reality.” National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac immediately contradicted him, insisting the government does not endorse the two-state theory. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun weighed in as well, stating he “cannot share such a position” and dismissing Chung’s remarks as “an emotional attempt to find a breakthrough.”

Most recently, the government’s decision to support a U.N. resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights violations—a reversal from the Moon Jae-in administration’s 2019-21 abstentions—has further muddied Seoul’s message to Pyongyang. A Foreign Ministry official defended the move, saying “Our government believes it is important to make tangible improvements to the human rights of North Korean people.” Yet this stance sits uneasily alongside Lee’s professed desire for warmer inter-Korean relations, given Pyongyang’s extreme sensitivity to such criticism.

Dead in the Water?

Seoul’s contradictory messaging has not gone unnoticed in Pyongyang—and the consequences could prove highly unfavorable for the ROK. These policy incoherences, combined with North Korea’s significantly strengthened position following its deepening partnership with Russia, have left Kim Jong Un even less inclined to entertain Seoul’s diplomatic overtures.

North Korean state media has seized on Lee’s mixed signals as vindication of Pyongyang’s longstanding position that engagement with the South is futile. In recent months, KCNA has accused Lee of “pretending” to seek improved relations while projecting an “amicable image,” branding him “a confrontation maniac” and referring to the ROK as “the one and only political poor in the world who has offered all its sovereignty to the U.S.”

More specifically, Kim Yo Jong, sister of leader Kim Jong Un, explicitly described the Lee government as displaying a “double character” accusing the current administration of “carrying two faces under the hood.”

Kim Jong Un himself weighed in on Lee’s contradictions during his September speech to the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly. The North Korean leader specifically highlighted Seoul’s new defense budget, noting that military spending under Lee would “far surpass” even that of the previous conservative Yoon administration.

An August KCNA article also highlighted contradictions in Lee’s Japan policy, accusing him of adopting a hardline stance during his presidential campaign only to cave to American pressure once in office. The article framed Lee’s subsequent pursuit of closer Tokyo ties as proof of “Seoul’s intention to actively participate in carrying out the Indo-Pacific strategy of the U.S”—further confirmation, in Pyongyang’s view, of the administration’s duplicity. Kim Yo Jong also drove the point home more bluntly, dismissing Lee’s North Korea policy as “little short of their predecessor’s.”

Inter-Korean relations had already deteriorated to their lowest point in years before Lee even assumed office, with Pyongyang explicitly rejecting any prospect of engagement with Seoul. Lee’s contradictory approach—rhetoric favoring dialogue coupled with accelerated military buildup and commitments toward closer alignment with Washington and Tokyo—has only reinforced Kim Jong Un’s disinterest in resuming diplomacy with the South.

Priorities over Ambition

While pragmatism is essential for South Korea given its complex geopolitical environment, the country’s foreign policy—particularly toward North Korea—requires substantial refinement to reconcile its internal contradictions. As one analyst aptly noted, policy disagreements at the highest levels of the security establishment risk slowing response times during crises or miscalculations, creating vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit.

Lee faces a genuine strategic dilemma. Maintaining robust security cooperation with Washington is necessary to achieve longer-term goals like OPCON transfer, and North Korea’s deepening military partnership with Russia means Seoul cannot afford complacency as Pyongyang’s capabilities expand rapidly. Yet the short-term imperative to strengthen defense ties with the US and Japan—ostensibly to build toward greater strategic autonomy—may paradoxically solidify the peninsula’s division rather than advance reunification, a goal still enshrined in the ROK constitution.

Attempting to pursue contradictory objectives simultaneously risks achieving none of them. The resurgence of factional competition within South Korea’s foreign policy elite exposes an unresolved tension between aspirations for strategic autonomy and the reality of security dependence—a divide that demands reconciliation into a coherent strategic framework.

Three priorities demand immediate attention. First, the government must speak with one voice. Constant public contradictions among senior ministers project weakness rather than resolve to both Pyongyang and the international community.

Second, Lee must acknowledge the limitations of direct inter-Korean engagement under current conditions. Rather than pursuing ambitious inter-Korean cooperation schemes, Seoul should ground its approach in achievable near-term objectives that could yield meaningful long-term dividends for both inter-Korean relations and regional stability.

Third, and most strategically, the Lee government should prioritize facilitating the resumption of US-DPRK diplomacy. If Washington and Pyongyang return to the table, opportunities for broader inter-Korean cooperation are likely to follow, eventually.

Seoul recognizes this logic, as evidenced by Lee’s consistent appeals for Trump to engage with Kim Jong Un. The question is whether the administration can align its actions with this recognition, setting aside more ambitious but currently unattainable goals to focus singularly on creating the conditions for renewed US-DPRK dialogue.

Kim Jong Un appears to be widening North Korea’s diplomatic horizons beyond its well-known great-power allies. The latest sign of this shift came during last week’s annual military parade in Pyongyang. While Russian and Chinese delegations were expected, what stood out was the presence of high-ranking officials from several Southeast Asian nations—suggesting that Pyongyang is actively seeking to diversify its international relationships.

The North Korean leader has undeniably elevated his country’s global standing in recent years. Most recently, his appearance at Beijing’s military parade alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin last month projected an image of North Korea as anything but isolated or weak. Ties with Russia, in particular, have brought tangible benefits: arms deals, a renewed defense treaty, and North Korean troop deployments to assist in Russia’s war against Ukraine— all strengthening Pyongyang’s position regionally and globally.

Yet Kim likely recognizes the fragility of these gains. North Korea’s ties with Russia, while valuable, remain vulnerable to rapid changes, especially in the event of an end to the conflict in Ukraine.

Last week’s visits by Vietnamese, Laotian, and Indonesian delegations to Pyongyang signal growing North Korean interest in the region. This trend toward greater engagement with Southeast Asia has been building since 2023, but recent engagements suggest a more deliberate diplomatic shift.

A notable visitor last week was Indonesia’s foreign minister, whose trip marked the first of its kind in over a decade. The two countries renewed an MoU to expand cooperation in political, socio-cultural, technical, and sports sectors. While details of the agreement remain limited, the symbolism of the visit itself carried significant weight—a signal that North Korea seeks to project the image of a state with diverse international partners, beyond Russia and China.

Indonesia’s engagement is particularly significant given its historic leadership role within ASEAN. During his visit, the Indonesian foreign minister specifically expressed interest in helping North Korea engage more substantively with ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For Jakarta, this strategy of engagement serves its own ambitions to be seen as a middle power capable of facilitating diplomacy and contributing to regional stability. As great power competition in Asia intensifies, middle powers like Indonesia see an opportunity to establish influence over the regional order.

Beyond Indonesia, Kim held talks with Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm and signed various agreements to expand cooperation in several areas. According to the Vietnamese government, the agreements cover cooperation in defense, healthcare, culture, media, aviation, judicial assistance, investment, and double taxation avoidance. Kim also met with Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith, who was the highest-ranking official and the only head of state to attend the October 10 celebrations. Both sides agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

Beyond strengthening bilateral ties with North Korea, ASEAN nations could play a meaningful mediating role on the Korean Peninsula, building on their historical track record. During the Six Party Talks era in the 2000s, ASEAN member states like Malaysia and Singapore facilitated several meetings between the United States and North Korea, as well as inter-Korean meetings when representatives attended the ARF or other ASEAN-related events. While not all meetings produced tangible results, they kept communication channels open to all parties and helped sustain diplomacy.

ASEAN, in particular, could leverage its tradition of neutrality and consensus-building to mediate between the different sides through both formal and informal channels. By using existing platforms such as the ARF, it could foster regular dialogue involving North Korea, the United States, and regional stakeholders, creating space for confidence-building measures and de-escalation. Humanitarian engagement and cooperation with North Korea in areas like agriculture and public health could further serve as entry points for constructive interaction, helping to build trust and expand opportunities for diplomacy and advancing the peace process.

Several Southeast Asian states stand out as potential mediators for DPRK diplomacy.

Indonesia has long upheld a firmly non-aligned foreign policy and is widely regarded as one of ASEAN’s key leaders. For example, its decision to invite Russia to the 2022 G20 Summit—despite considerable Western pressure—underscored Jakarta’s independent approach to international diplomacy. Thailand represents another option due to its existing ties with Pyongyang and its track record of having effectively mediated between diverse parties in the past. Singapore and Vietnam are also strong candidates, having hosted the U.S.-North Korea summits in 2018 and 2019 respectively.

In fact, ASEAN’s role could become even more critical now that North Korea has enshrined South Korea as its “principal enemy” in its constitution, effectively closing the door on inter-Korean diplomacy and significantly weakening Seoul’s role as a potential mediator between Washington and Pyongyang. With Singapore and Vietnam as valuable precedents, ASEAN could once again attempt mediation between the U.S. and North Korea.

According to Kim Beng Phar, former director of the Political and Security Community of the ASEAN Secretariat, such a move would align with Donald Trump’s stated desire to resume talks with Kim Jong Un and could serve as a vehicle for drawing Trump into deeper engagement with the Southeast Asian bloc.1

During his first term, Trump attended the 2017 ASEAN summit but skipped subsequent gatherings, raising questions about his administration’s commitment to the region. Relations with the bloc have also shown little improvement in his second term so far.

Besides the difficulties ASEAN states would face in effectively mediating between Washington and Pyongyang given Trump’s noncommittal attitude to the region, the bloc’s ties with the DPRK also face its own list of challenges. North Korea’s history of illicit operations throughout Southeast Asia, including cybercrime, oil and luxury goods smuggling, arms trafficking, and high-profile political assassinations, have particularly compounded regional concerns about deeper engagement.

A return to nuclear testing or increased military tensions on the peninsula could further hamper engagement prospects with a bloc that also seeks to maintain strong relationships with the United States and South Korea.

Regarding the latter, the Lee Jae-myung administration would also benefit from deepening engagement with ASEAN to strengthen the bloc’s role as a constructive mediator in Korean Peninsula diplomacy. Expanding outreach to Southeast Asia would also align with Lee’s emphasis on pragmatic diplomacy. By encouraging ASEAN to play a more active role in dialogue involving North Korea, Seoul could help facilitate the resumption of U.S.–DPRK talks while also creating potential space for inter-Korean dialogue to restart.

North Korea’s absence from an upcoming ASEAN summit in Malaysia suggests that Pyongyang has not yet fully prioritized ties with the Southeast Asian bloc, placing its Russia diplomacy above other engagements for now. Nevertheless, North Korea is likely to gradually increase exchanges with ASEAN states as part of its long-term diplomatic strategy. Shared values between North Korea and ASEAN—including support for a multipolar world order and respect for state sovereignty—could also facilitate the further development of ties.

Moving forward, upcoming ASEAN chairs, particularly Singapore in 2027 and Thailand in 2028, could play a more proactive role in facilitating regional engagement with North Korea during Trump’s second term.

The challenge for ASEAN will be maintaining ties with North Korea, primarily in non-sensitive areas, while demonstrating to Washington that it can play a constructive role in helping Trump reach a deal with Pyongyang. If successful, Trump may shift his focus to the region and entertain the possibility of the bloc, or individual Southeast Asian states, playing a mediating role in U.S.-North Korea relations.

For now, Kim Jong Un’s courtship of Southeast Asia represents a calculated move—an effort to ensure that North Korea’s hard-won image as a strong global player outlasts any single partnership. Regardless of Kim Jong Un’s underlying motives, the deepening of North Korea’s engagement with Southeast Asia could create important diplomatic opportunities that the relevant parties, including Seoul and Washington, should seize.

The “ironclad” U.S.-South Korea military alliance stands at a crossroads. As Washington pushes for alliance "modernization" to address China's growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul finds itself navigating between American strategic imperatives and its own national interests. This tension, exemplified by growing calls from U.S. officials to expand the alliance’s military scope beyond deterring North Korea, highlights the complex challenges facing South Korea's new leadership.

USFK Focus: From Peninsula to the Pacific?

Seoul and Washington need to modernize their decades-long military alliance through "adaptability” to better face the evolved security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. This was the main argument made by General Xavier Brunson, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), on Wednesday.

Citing China's "unprecedented" encircling military drills against Taiwan in 2022, the U.S. General called for greater efforts at promoting collective security among like-minded nations, emphasizing that “security is not only about capabilities, but it's about coalitions, nations willing to come together quickly in moments of crisis.”

Brunson also praised the ongoing U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral military drills, which kicked off earlier this week, saying “we are expanding beyond bilateral deterrence to integrated regional security."

The General's remarks follow months of speculation in Seoul about potential Trump Administration plans to reconfigure USFK's mission in response to the region's evolving geopolitical landscape. Multiple U.S. officials have already voiced support for this policy shift.

In July, South Korean officials reportedly said that Washington had formally asked South Korea to broaden the scope of the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to cover the wider Indo-Pacific region, calling the move part of the goal to “modernize” the U.S.-ROK alliance. The development came at around the same time when U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies throughout the Pacific Ocean, including the South China Sea, leading to further concerns of similar expectations for Seoul under the U.S.-ROK treaty.

The State Department also directly confirmed with South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo plans to “rebalance” the roles of the USFK and South Korean military to better address regional threats.

The following month, a Pentagon official stated that efforts by the allies to modernize their alliance include expanding cooperation to ensure credible deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and "beyond"— further signaling Washington's interest in introducing greater flexibility in the use of its forces stationed in the ROK.

The State Department also expanded on this idea of modernizing the alliance, calling for an "increase in ROK defense burden-sharing," emphasizing the need for the alliance to adapt "amid an evolving regional security environment."

In addition to his comments made this week, USFK General Brunson also reaffirmed the need for modernizing the alliance last month, stating that “there needs to be changes within USFK.” He specifically cited the growing threat posed by Russia in the region as well as “the Chinese and the threat that they pose to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Other U.S. experts have also doubled down on the need to “modernize” the U.S.-ROK alliance, arguing that “the alliance cannot be defined solely by North Korea.” The idea to establish a “Pacific Defense Pact” has also been floated around earlier this year. According to this concept, as a potential member, South Korea could “support a broader regional orientation for its own military” and that of the U.S. forces stationed on its territory.

While much of the focus is currently on what Trump will do next, efforts to redirect American resources in the region toward addressing China's military buildup began well before Trump's return to office. Despite fundamental disagreements on many policy fronts, both former President Biden and Trump agree on the need to strengthen America's response to Beijing's growing influence.

To this end, Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy directly called for the U.S. “to modernize our treaty alliances” with partners in the region, including the ROK, while stressing the need to “work in flexible groupings that pool our collective strength to face up to the defining issues of our time.”

The main way Biden pushed this strategy forward with regards to the Korean Peninsula was by encouraging and facilitating greater cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. The deepening of the trilateral partnership between the U.S., ROK, and Japan featured particularly prominently in the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and three-way cooperation did successfully reach new heights under Biden and former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol.

Seoul's Strategic Dilemma: ‘Collective’ Security vs. National Interest

While trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan military drills are taking place this week, it remains to be seen how far the new ROK leader, Lee Jae-myung, is willing to go to continue fostering greater trilateral military cooperation involving Japan. During his election campaign, Lee explicitly said he would not be adopting the Yoon government’s Indo-Pacific strategy—which sought to expand the scope of South Korea’s defense activities throughout the region— vowing instead to return to the New Southern Policy and New Northern Policy of the former Moon Jae-in administration.

Still, as is the case for every South Korean president, Lee finds himself in a difficult position. While Washington remains Seoul’s most crucial military ally, South Korea’s national security interests don’t necessarily align with those of the U.S. when it comes to Indo-Pacific policy.

Seoul recognizes its strong economic ties with Beijing and cannot afford to align unconditionally with Washington on regional political and security matters. While America's primary concern centers on a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, this issue holds relatively less significance for South Korea than the persistent threat of North Korean aggression.

The USFK Commander acknowledged these divergent priorities in July, stating that "I don't think it should be considered a foregone conclusion that we're saying, 'Hey, if we go to Taiwan, you're going to Taiwan too'." Brunson clarified that "What's being asked of Korea is to be stronger against DPRK—that we might have the flexibility as we modernize our alliance so that we could go do other things."

However, the ambiguous phrase "go do other things" opens the door to multiple interpretations. Even without a reduction in U.S. troop levels on the peninsula, Seoul faces mounting pressure to adopt increasingly confrontational military postures alongside Tokyo and Washington against Beijing.

Such positioning would inevitably antagonize China and damage bilateral relations. Moreover, it would likely provoke stronger responses from Pyongyang and potentially deepen trilateral cooperation between China, North Korea, and Russia—creating a dangerous cycle of regional instability that could spiral into miscalculation and military confrontation.

Complicating matters further, Lee has pledged to secure the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK military forces back to South Korea during his presidency. Yet achieving this goal paradoxically demands that Seoul significantly increase defense investments and military capabilities while deepening coordination with U.S. forces.

This creates an inherent contradiction: while regaining OPCON holds the promise of greater strategic autonomy, the pathway to this idea of military independence requires intensified security commitments with the United States, at least in the short term.

The modernization of the U.S.-ROK alliance reflects broader shifts in great power competition, but Seoul will have to carefully navigate between alliance obligations and national interests. While Washington's strategic logic focuses on China containment, South Korea's security priorities remain more complex.

President Lee faces the delicate task of maintaining alliance solidarity while preserving strategic flexibility. The stakes extend beyond bilateral relations—miscalculations in this modernization process of the alliance could destabilize the entire Northeast Asian security architecture.

Success will require Seoul to articulate a clear vision that strengthens deterrence on the Korean Peninsula without automatically escalating tensions elsewhere in the region. The challenge lies not in choosing between Washington and Beijing, but in crafting a strategy that serves South Korea's long-term interests while contributing meaningfully to regional stability.

North Korea and China have been experiencing somewhat of a stalemate in bilateral ties in recent years, mainly due to Pyongyang’s pivot to Moscow. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang's exchanges with Beijing have markedly decreased, making Kim Jong Un's visit to China this week his first trip to the country in six years.

Kim’s bilateral summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday marked a notable step toward repairing strained ties, with Xi emphasizing how “highly” his country values the friendship with the DPRK. Both leaders vowed to consolidate and further develop relations between their two countries “no matter how the international situation may change.”

The meeting with Xi came one day after Kim attended China's major military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Victory Day. Notably, he also used the occasion as an opportunity to meet one-on-one with Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Although Kim's China visit helped the two countries take important steps toward repairing relations following years of deepened North Korea-Russia cooperation, Kim’s underlying reasons for the trip extended well beyond mere diplomatic reconciliation with China.

Kim's Global Statesman Strategy

Kim Jong Un had numerous opportunities to deepen ties with China over recent years, particularly in 2024, which marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. A visit to Beijing then would have demonstrated genuine commitment to strengthening their historic alliance. Instead, Kim chose to attend this specific parade in 2025—a decision driven primarily by the powerful optics it would produce.

The North Korean leader has been steadily building his international profile since his summits with Donald Trump in 2018-2019. Putin's visit to Pyongyang in 2024 to sign a mutual defense treaty further elevated Kim's status as a global player.

Kim's attendance at the parade this week marked his debut at a multilateral diplomatic event, further cementing this narrative. Notably, North Korean media coverage also emphasized this transformation, noting how Kim "had a picture taken with heads of state and government of different countries" and "attended the reception together with the leaders of different countries." The visuals were particularly striking: Kim seated alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and later dining with other world leaders.

Moreover, Kim's decision to leverage the Chinese celebrations as a venue for a bilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin further demonstrated his audacious approach toward Beijing and his willingness to assert North Korean autonomy on the global stage.

North Korean media's photo coverage also revealed a clear contrast in tone between Kim’s interactions with the two leaders. While images of the Kim-Xi summit conveyed a distinctly ceremonial atmosphere,— with the majority of photographs depicting the two leaders engaged in dialogue in an official conference room— photos with Putin appeared notably more intimate, including shots of the two leaders in Putin's private limousine and sharing tea in what looked like a relaxed setting.

In the end, Kim achieved what he wanted: major photo ops with Putin and Xi as well as the opportunity to showcase his participation in a multilateral diplomatic setting with over 20 world leaders.

The Widening Gap Between Beijing and Pyongyang

The cooling of China-North Korea relations has been ongoing for some years now. A review of North Korea's Korean Central News Agency articles from September 2023 to November 2024 revealed only eight diplomatic visits or exchanges between North Korea and China. In contrast, North Korea engaged in over 30 high-level exchanges with Russia in 2024 alone.

This disparity is evident in other areas as well. When North Korea relaxed its pandemic border restrictions, Russian tourists were the first allowed entry—despite Chinese tourists historically comprising the overwhelming majority of visitors to North Korea.

Several factors explain this drift. North Korea has reportedly grown frustrated with China's perceived lack of support, particularly Beijing's reluctance to provide sanctioned materials needed for domestic development projects or sensitive military technology that could enhance Pyongyang's nuclear and weapons programs. Russia, by contrast, has shown greater willingness to provide various materials and weapons regardless of international condemnation.

The two allies also disagree on other issues. While Beijing has sought to expand its influence by sharing its development model abroad, Pyongyang remains wary of excessive Chinese interference in its internal affairs. More critically, while China supports the ultimate denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Kim has made increasingly clear since the failed 2019 Hanoi summit that he has no intention of abandoning his nuclear weapons. North Korea's enhanced military cooperation with Russia only compounds Beijing's concerns, as it could lead to greater North Korean capabilities, more military provocations, and—worst of all for China—increased U.S. military presence in the region.

Although Thursday’s Kim-Xi summit had friendly overtones, no concrete commitments to expand cooperation in any specific area were made. Nevertheless, the talks represent a significant step toward resuming more regular cooperation and deepening ties.

Notably, the two sides discussed “the independent policy stands maintained by the parties and governments of the two countries in the field of external relations.” The latter is likely to have included Pyongyang’s policy stance toward Moscow.

While this represents a step in the right direction for Beijing in terms of regaining some lost ground with Pyongyang, there is no guarantee Kim will maintain the same level of eagerness to engage with China once he returns back home.

Given the high stakes involved, China now stands at a difficult crossroads. On the one hand, it seeks to project itself as a responsible global power capable of rivaling the United States. On the other hand, it highly values maintaining regional stability for its economic and security interests. The latter includes keeping North Korea in check through regular engagement and cooperation—a task made increasingly difficult due to Putin and Kim’s ever tightening bond.

Strategic Calculations and Future Prospects

Given the rapidly expanding Moscow-Pyongyang ties and China's resulting loss of influence, Beijing now finds itself faced with complex questions. Should it maintain distance from North Korea to preserve its international reputation, or should it engage more actively to regain influence from Russia? Alternatively, Beijing may be betting that Pyongyang will eventually return to China's orbit once the Ukraine conflict subsides and Russia's immediate need for North Korean support diminishes.

In the short term, however, China will likely need to adjust its North Korea strategy. Beijing could offer expanded cooperation in areas that matter to Pyongyang while minimizing damage to China's reputation—infrastructure development, agricultural modernization, transportation, pharmaceuticals, and select IT sectors like e-commerce. China might also proactively expand existing Special Economic Zones to increase trade and reduce North Korea's long-term dependence on Russian income.

During Kim's last visit to China in 2019, he expressed interest in learning from China's development experience. Beijing should capitalize on this interest sooner rather than later to regain some of the lost influence over Pyongyang.

Beyond economics, both countries share fundamental strategic interests: reducing U.S. influence on the peninsula and advancing a multipolar world order. While Russia shares these goals, its immediate focus remains more narrowly nationalist, centered on Ukraine. China, however, arguably demonstrates greater commitment to these long-term regional objectives.

During the Korean War, it was China—not the Soviet Union—that sent ground troops to defend North Korea. China and North Korea have maintained a mutual defense treaty since 1961—China's only such agreement—while Russia only renewed its defense pact with Pyongyang in 2024 after it expired in the 1990s. This pattern reveals Russia's tendency to court North Korea when it serves Moscow's interests rather than reflecting an unconditional alliance.

While short-term gains from Russia may seem like a windfall for Kim Jong Un, this partnership won't last forever. Even if it outlives the Ukraine conflict, Russia's overall power position cannot match that of China. For these fundamental reasons, Kim would be wise to keep some of his strategic eggs in Beijing's basket.

South Korea's new President Lee Jae-myung has wasted no time pivoting his country's foreign policy toward reconciliation with North Korea. During his first summit with US President Donald Trump on Monday, Lee pressed this agenda forward, advocating for renewed talks with Pyongyang while emphasizing the American leader's unique position as "the only person who can solve this problem."

In response, Trump expressed his willingness to meet with Kim Jong Un “in the appropriate future,” even jokingly offering to set up a meeting between Kim and Lee.

While no concrete steps were agreed upon, the meeting between Lee and Trump was an overall success for the new South Korean president, who desperately wants (and needs) to restabilize inter-Korean relations after their collapse under the previous Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

Although Trump's election earlier this year raised hopes for revived dialogue, the US president's foreign policy agenda has been consumed by conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. While Trump has expressed his interest in resuming talks with Kim Jong Un repeatedly, his actual focus has been on Kim’s new best friend: Russian President Vladimir Putin.

This may perpetuate the Korean stalemate in the short term, but successful Trump-Putin diplomacy could yield long-term benefits for US-DPRK, and ultimately inter-Korean, relations. If Trump secures a deal with Putin on Ukraine, Moscow could potentially mediate between Pyongyang and Washington, creating a positive chain reaction that reduces North Korean provocations and opens channels for inter-Korean dialogue. But can Seoul afford to wait for Trump's attention to return to Pyongyang—if it ever does?

The geopolitical landscape facing President Lee differs dramatically from that of his predecessor Moon Jae-in, who brought the two Koreas closer than they had been in years. Two developments have now raised the stakes considerably: North Korea's deepened relationship with Russia and its abandonment of unification as a goal.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine proved a godsend for Kim Jong Un amid the pandemic. Pyongyang's early support for Moscow's attack didn't go unnoticed in the Kremlin. Bilateral exchanges and economic cooperation began increasing, culminating in June 2024 when both leaders agreed to revive a mutual defense pact. While some observers dismissed this as propaganda, Kim quickly demonstrated the agreement's substance.

What seemed unthinkable just years ago became reality: North Korea deployed troops to Europe to support Russia's war against Ukraine. Real soldiers, on European soil. Here it was, on full display, what decades of sanctions had accomplished: a North Korea more powerful and emboldened than ever.

This is bad news for South Korea and for the fate of inter-Korean relations. First, it means North Korea is nowhere near as isolated as it was back in 2018, when inter-Korean ties were at high.

Beyond China's continued support, North Korea now has another major power backing it, complete with military guarantees. In any inter-Korean conflict, Pyongyang could count on military support from both Beijing and Moscow. This dramatically raises the stakes for Seoul in avoiding conflict while underscoring North Korea's reduced incentive for diplomatic engagement with the ROK. From Kim's perspective, what can Seoul offer that's valuable enough to pause his lucrative relationship with Moscow?

The second significant issue blocking the progress of inter-Korean relations is North Korea’s decision to abandon the goal of unification. Kim shocked the world with this reversal in a December 2023 speech, arguing that pursuing unification no longer seemed strategically wise. According to North Korea, the South—particularly under former President Yoon—was preparing for "unification by absorption," aiming to eliminate the Kim regime and forcibly control the northern peninsula rather than seek genuine peace. While the Yoon government spoke of peace, its real plans were far from it.

Although the Yoon administration is now gone, North Korea's constitutional change labeling the ROK as a "hostile state" remains. This makes it difficult for Pyongyang to make a sudden U-turn and declare openness to reconciliation with Seoul. Unless Kim has substantial gains to pursue—such as a Trump summit—he wouldn't risk losing face domestically and internationally.

Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his stance on Wednesday, issuing a statement criticizing the South Korean leader’s remarks made in Washington this week regarding denuclearization. According to Kim, no talks with Trump will materialize as long as Washington continues pushing for the DPRK to give up its nukes.

With trust between the two Koreas at a zero, Lee has his work cut out for him if he wants to get inter-Korean ties anywhere near where they were under Moon. While the obstacles are many, there is a bare minimum the Lee government can do to, at least, not make things worse:

• Reinstate inter-Korean agreements (especially the 9.19 Inter-Korean military agreement) as a show of goodwill and to prevent a further rise in tensions.

• Continue outreach to Pyongyang with the goal of restoring inter-Korean communication lines. This is a must to prevent misunderstandings and to keep heated situations at bay.

• Refrain from responding in kind to North Korean provocations. It doesn’t show strength, it just makes things worse. The world knows the ROK has great military power. The DPRK does too. Sending drones across the border or shooting near the DMZ isn’t the wisest way of showing off power.

• Consider decreasing, if not halting, military drills along the border with the DPRK.

• Maintain close trilateral cooperation with Beijing and Tokyo (not just Japan, as was the case under Yoon). China’s power and influence vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula has been evident for thousands of years. This remains the case in 2025, especially given its continued close ties with Pyongyang.

• Push, push, push for Trump to focus on the North Korea issue. South Korea’s best bet for reviving inter-Korean cooperation starts with the resumption of US-DPRK talks. Lee must get Trump’s attention back on the peninsula, despite the many other issues demanding his attention.

While the prognosis for inter-Korean relations under Lee looks rather bleak, there is still hope. The war in Ukraine could end in the latter’s favor, leaving Russia in a deeply unfavorable position. This could, in turn, weaken North Korea and make them reconsider diplomacy with the US.

Or, even if the war in Ukraine rages on, Trump may pull yet another unpredictable move and decide to suddenly shift his focus to what he may perceive as a more “solvable” problem—North Korea. He could choose to acknowledge the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state and set the foundation for renewed talks. Diplomacy could resume from there.

On the other hand, Trump may forget all about Kim and focus his entire term on Ukraine, Israel, and China.

With the unpredictability surrounding Trump and the hostility plaguing inter-Korean ties, the cards are not stacked in Lee’s favor. For now, the South Korean President will have to play the long game and focus on tension reduction, consistent communication with Washington, and setting a foundation for the reparation of nonexistent inter-Korean trust.

Kim Jong Un portraits, murals, paintings, and even badges—these are just some of the symbols that have recently been used to boost the North Korean leader’s personality cult. While his predecessors have long enjoyed their own, carefully crafted, personality cults for decades, the current leader is taking deliberate steps to promote his image as the country’s supreme authority figure.

Over the years, North Korean state media has relentlessly embellished the third-generation leader’s image, consistently highlighting his accomplishments and leadership skills. The latter were again underscored over the weekend, in a front-page article of the Rodong Sinmun. While the piece was meant to highlight the greatness of Kim Il Sung ahead of his death anniversary on July 8, it was also used to emphasize Kim Jong Un’s achievements and called for complete loyalty to the current leader.

While Kim Jong Un has not completely done away with the idolization of his father or grandfather, there is a clear shift in North Korea’s propaganda strategy lately, possibly setting the stage for a much more dominant personality cult surrounding the current leader. While state-run media continues to mention the greatness of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the focus is increasingly being placed on publicizing the current leader’s excellence.

The reasons for this strong focus on the cult of personality relatively early in his rule— compared to his predecessors— may be related to various factors, including a desire to push forward new policy lines (e.g. abandoning the goal of unification), to name his successor early (maybe due to health concerns), and to solidify his position as the utmost authority in the DPRK (a status higher than that of his grandfather and father).

The moves to boost Kim Jong Un’s personality cult also come as the North Korean leader continues to make great strides on the international stage. Kim Jong Un is more emboldened than ever for various reasons, including the signing of a renewed mutual defense agreement with Russia last month, advancements in its military capabilities and missile technology, the expiration of the UN Panel of Expert’s mandate on North Korea, and continued support from China.

Establishing a solid position both internally and externally will further help Kim Jong Un strengthen his authority at home while also increasing his leverage over the United States.

But this emboldened version of Kim Jong Un was not created overnight. It has taken over a decade for the leader to strengthen his position to where it is now. As such, it’s worth taking a look back at how Kim Jong Un went from young successor to embodying his own, ruthless leadership style.

Young but qualified

The cult surrounding Kim Jong Un began soon after he was chosen to be his father, Kim Jong Il’s, successor. Even before he took over power, newspapers covered Kim Jong Un accompanying his father on guidance tours to highlight how he learned the necessary skills to succeed his father. According to one 2018 North Korean book titled “Son of the People,” Kim Jong Un was always destined to succeed his father and was more than ready for the position when the time came.

North Korean media promoted a song for Kim called 발걸음 (Footsteps) and Kim Jong Il later promoted his son to 대장 (general) in September 2010, further setting the foundation for his succession.

North Korean media was also quick to prop up the young Kim immediately after the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, with one article published two days after his father’s death emphasizing Kim Jong Un’s role in completing the Juche ‘revolutionary cause.’ Another article called for the people to rally around Kim Jong Un, describing him as “a symbol of victory and an outstanding leader.”

Besides celebrating his past work alongside his father, the new leader’s image was also carefully crafted in accordance with traditional North Korean propaganda methods.

One of the classic ways North Korean propaganda creates a positive image of its leaders is by presenting them as caring fatherly figures. For example, one of Kim Il Sung’s biographies states that, of all the titles bestowed upon him, he was most proud of being called a “fatherly leader” by the people. According to the book, the appellation was “an expression of the feelings of the people, who lived under his paternal care” and to the people, he was “their benevolent and dependable father.”

Kim Jong Un’s interactions with children were, and continue to be, particularly highlighted by the media, such as one May 2012 article that emphasized his “paternal love” for children displayed through his gifting of musical instruments to North Korean youth.

Kim’s young age was also used to build a connection with the younger generation, with various North Korean media regularly publicizing his achievements with youth organizations and his role in the construction of facilities for the youth, such as water parks, skating rinks, cinemas, ski resorts, etc.

Reincarnation of hope

Perhaps the main feature of propaganda efforts in Kim’s early years in power was the attempt to draw as many similarities as possible between the new leader and his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. These efforts were particularly aided by the fact that Kim Jong Un bore a striking physical resemblance to Kim Il Sung. The new leader capitalized on this and took things further by wearing similar glasses as Kim Il Sung as well as copying his fashion style and mannerisms.

North Korean media and other publications also emphasized these similarities between the country’s founder and that of their current leader.

The reason why this resemblance was given so much focus was because, to the North Korean people, Kim Il Sung was the symbol of freedom and power and associated with much more prosperous times. The North Korean population went through extreme hardship after the death of Kim Il Sung, with the nation suffering a horrible famine in the early 1990s, natural disasters, economic collapse, and international isolation in the wake of the fall of communism. Even when Kim Jong Un took power, poverty and food shortages remained widespread issues.

Evoking this image of Kim Il Sung through Kim Jong Un was aimed at stirring up the feelings of loyalty, love, and admiration that the people had for their first leader. The hope was that, despite the current hardships, Kim Il Sung’s legacy would be enough to make people want to support his grandson as the new ruler. (Not that the people had much of a choice, but the propaganda efforts to make this link were considerable).

A powerful global player

Another way Kim Jong Un’s image has been propped up is through his achievements on the international stage. The most notable example of this took place in 2018 when the North Korean leader held summits with US President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The former was a particularly monumental win for Kim, as no sitting US president had ever met with a North Korean leader until then.

North Korean media reported on the June 12 US-DPRK Singapore Summit in great detail, describing the events of that day that led up to the signing of the Joint Statement between the two leaders. North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun hailed the summit as a great achievement for the country, with its leader not only securing an in-person meeting with the US president but also signing a document aimed at developing “new” US-DPRK relations centered around the principles of peace and prosperity. 

North Korean reports particularly made note of Trump’s appreciation to Kim for his “proactive peace-loving measures” that allowed an atmosphere of peace and stability to be created on the Korean Peninsula. A strong focus was also placed on covering how the international community was reacting to the summit, with various North Korean news articles reporting on the praise Kim Jong Un was receiving in newspapers and media around the world for making this summit happen. One article said it was thanks to Kim’s “determination and will” to create a future of peace and security that the summit was able to take place while another credited the achievement to Kim’s “genius foresight and outstanding political power.”

However, with the subsequent Hanoi summit failing to produce any tangible results for Kim Jong Un, North Korean media instead attempted to paint the summit as a positive step in the direction of establishing new US-DPRK relations, without mentioning the major negotiating roadblocks encountered at the meeting. The focus was also shifted to save the leader’s face by covering Kim’s meetings with Vietnamese government officials. Kim’s talks with Vietnam’s leaders were portrayed as a major diplomatic win, with state media framing the visit as Kim Jong Un continuing his grandfather’s legacy by tying it to Kim Il Sung’s last visit to Vietnam in 1964.

Another attempt at boosting the North Korean leader’s image came in June, when Kim once again met with Trump, this time at the inter-Korean border. North Korean media was deliberate in their framing of the meeting, emphasizing that the meeting” took place at the US president’s “request” and “suggestion.” The goal here was to show that it was the US, not North Korea, that was more desperate for a meeting. This framing helps boost Kim’s image at home as a powerful international statesman, someone whom even the leader of the United States seeks to meet.

Although US-DPRK diplomatic progress has remained stalemated since 2019, the North Korean leader’s image continues to be strengthened through the use of summits and exchanges with major leaders. The most recent example of this was the summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin last month.

Deepening relations with Russia since the latter’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has served Kim Jong Un well on various fronts. Besides the opportunity to earn foreign currency by selling arms to Russia for use in Ukraine, Putin’s growing interest in deepening relations with the North Korean leader has helped boost Kim’s image at home as that of a leader retaining international influence while also strengthening his position and leverage vis-à-vis external actors such as the US.

Particularly, the reintroduction of a mutual defense clause in the friendship treaty signed between the two leaders at their latest summit carries significant symbolic—and real, security and military—meaning. The treaty serves multiple propaganda purposes.

For one, it shows the domestic audience that their leader has not been isolated, despite the international community’s best efforts. Two, it shows that North Korea—or Kim Jong Un— is not alone in the fight against “imperialism” (or the US-led world order). It has two major powers by its side: Russia and China. Three, it strengthens Kim’s leverage in future negotiations with the US, as the latter now has to consider the possibility of Russian military intervention in case North Korea is attacked. And four, it boosts Kim’s image as a skilled diplomat and leader, able to secure such a level of support from a major power like Russia.

The latest summit with Putin thus served to further strengthen Kim Jong Un’s image and position—both at home and abroad.

Propaganda overhaul?

Kim Jong Un’s personality cult has continued to expand in recent years, with the North Korean leader even introducing his name into the 2019 revision of the DPRK constitution. The names of his predecessors had only appeared in the constitution after their death.

Various other changes also point to the gradual elevation of Kim Jong Un’s status over that of his father and grandfather. While both the first and second-generation leaders remain venerated in North Korean media, publications, and discourse, the names of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have been making less frequent appearances in official documents in recent years.

Kim Jong Un has also not shied away from playing a proactive and direct role in boosting his personality cult. For example, he appointed himself general secretary in 2021, taking the place “eternally” reserved for his deceased father. Moreover, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il portraits were no longer displayed on the stage backdrop during the 2021 party congress, while Kim Il Sung was also dropped from the youth league’s name the same year.

According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Agency (NIS), a new ideological concept labeled “Kimjongunism” (김정은주의) was also introduced in North Korea in October 2021, possibly signaling a move to replace the ideologies of Kim Jong Un’s predecessors, including Kimilsungism, Kimjongilism, and Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. However, the term has yet to appear in official North Korean media or publications. While countless articles make reference to Kim Jong Un’s great leadership qualities and achievements, the introduction of a specific ideology, such as ‘Kimjongunism’, is yet to take place.

Still, another significant development came the following year when the first Kim Jong Un mosaic mural was unveiled at a greenhouse farm. This was followed in 2023 when the first paintings of the current leader were revealed to the public.

Similar trends continued in 2024 when Kim Jong Un’s portrait was displayed for the first time in May on the face of a building next to those of the country’s former leaders. His portrait also appeared next to those of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il inside a classroom, but it has yet to become widespread or mandatory. Notably, Kim Jong Il portraits did not become mandatory until after his death.

Moreover, the introduction of Kim Jong Un badges at last month’s 10th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) further points to efforts at solidifying Kim’s personality cult. However, the badges, like the portraits, are yet to become a staple feature in North Korean society, with officials reverting back to the old Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il badges in the days following the plenum.

For now, there still seems to be enough room in Kim Jong Un’s world for the idolization of him as well as his two predecessors.

The Kim Jong Un way

While propaganda revering Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il has not been fully discarded, the current leader may be setting the stage to forge his own, unique path moving forward. North Korea is not the same country it was when his father, let alone grandfather, ruled. The DPRK today is a fully-fledged nuclear weapons state with rapidly advancing and expanding missile and other military capabilities. Kim Jong Un’s policy decisions moving forward will likely reflect these changes.

In reality, change is already happening on a large scale. Perhaps the most significant of these changes is Kim Jong Un’s breakaway from his predecessor’s goal of achieving national reunification with South Korea. Last December, the North Korean leader not only abandoned the goal of unification but also defined inter-Korean relations as relations between “hostile” and “belligerent” states.

The significance of this move cannot be stressed enough, as it does away with what has been the North’s goal from the beginning of the division of the peninsula over seven decades ago. Reunification with the South was constantly promoted and strived for throughout North Korea’s history, especially under Kim Il Sung.

For example, speaking to soldiers on February 20, 1948, Kim Il Sung reminded the young officers of their purpose: “to drive out the US imperialists occupying south Korea and accomplish the historic cause of national reunification.” Kim Il Sung continued promoting reunification until the very end, saying in April 1994 “Today, there is no patriotism more genuine than to devote oneself to the reunification of the country.” Kim Jong Il also promoted unification throughout his time as leader.

However, unlike his father or grandfather, the current leader does not have a direct connection or experience with historical issues like unification and likely sees the continuation of such a policy as incurring more costs than benefits.

If Kim Jong Un is willing to take such a drastic turn away from the policies of his predecessors by abandoning unification, it is possible he feels confident enough in his position as leader to begin carving out his own, unique policy lines separate from those of his father and grandfather.

Another possible surprise move could involve his young daughter, presumed to be named Ju-ae, whose appearances have become increasingly frequent since she first appeared alongside her father at an intercontinental ballistic missile test site in November 2022.

The first notable change in North Korean media coverage of Kim Ju Ae after this came in early January 2024, when reports suddenly started mentioning her in a separate sentence. This is comparable to how Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un were marked as different from regular officials when they were already established as successors. Kim Ju Ae then appeared on North Korean postage stamps alongside her father for the first time the following month. In total, Kim’s daughter made a total of 17 public appearances in 2023 alone, marking an unprecedented swift ascent into the spotlight.

One of the reasons for Kim Jong Un’s strong push to solidify his personality cult may be related to plans to name a successor early. The reason for this, however, is unclear. Kim may be suffering from serious health issues, or he may just want to secure a no. 2 ahead of time—better too early than too late. Alternatively, the move may be aimed at squashing the chance of a potential transfer of power occurring outside the Kim family, maybe involving high-level government or military officials. But with Kim Jong Un’s track record of getting rid of all opposition, this is less likely to be his motivation.

Another possibility is the threat posed to his authority by external information, such as films, books, music, and other materials from South Korea and the West. The more exposure North Korean citizens get to the outside world, the weaker Kim’s grip on power will be. Given the gravity of this threat, North Korean authorities have particularly beefed up their crackdowns on the consumption and spread of such materials in recent years.

Still, the North Korean leader remains emboldened and will likely continue introducing policies that fit with his vision for his country. With US-DPRK diplomacy still stalemated, inter-Korean relations at a dangerous low point, and Pyongyang deepening ties with Moscow, the current variables do not favor a return to dialogue or the de-escalation of tensions on the peninsula.

While change may be possible depending on the outcome of the upcoming US presidential elections, Kim is likely to stay on this course for the time being, backed by powerful partners abroad and a relentless propaganda machine at home.

To many, the very name “North Korea” is synonymous with human rights abuses. The North Korean human rights situation has particularly garnered attention since the 2014 UN’s Commision of Inquiry (COI) report on North Korean human rights was published. While the report uncovers a lengthy list of human rights abuses, one area that warrants closer examination is the rights of women.

Women have served as the backbone of North Korean society for a long time, especially since the famine in the 1990s resulted in the collapse of the state-run rations system. At the time, many women found a way to help themselves and their families survive by working at markets. Women’s economic power steadily grew and many soon became the main breadwinners. This trend continues till today. For instance, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, women were estimated to contribute more than 70 percent of the country’s household incomes. 

Nevertheless, women’s rights in North Korea are still not guaranteed and cases of sexual violence, forced marriage, human trafficking, domestic violence, forced abortions, and other abuses are still common. Ten years after the COI report was first published, it is worth taking a closer look at women’s rights in North Korea—what has changed and what has not.

Guaranteed rights?

Despite its dismal human rights record, North Korea prides itself on being a country that champions the rights of women. Article 77 of North Korea's constitution, for example, states that "women are accorded equal social status and rights with men." The state has emphasized the role of women even before the official establishment of the country. The Women’s Union, for example, was established in 1945 and is often quoted by the government as being a key organ in furthering the rights of women in North Korean society. Many defectors, however, disagree, arguing the Union mainly serves to teach Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il thought.

After the Korean War, the North Korean government pushed women to become actively involved in nation-building to restore the country and construct a powerful socialist state. By using films and literature, the government emphasized the achievements of heroic female workers and urged women to take up work, especially in light industry. Daycare centers and kindergartens were built for women to be able to work during the day instead of having to be at home to watch their children.

Over the years, the North Korean government has also established numerous laws related to the rights of women. Legally—at least on paper— women have equal economic, social, cultural, and political rights as men, they have equal rights to vote and to be elected for local and state supreme organs, equal rights with men to labor and education, and they enjoy equal rights in marriage and divorce.

In particular, North Korea in 2010 introduced the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women. According to the law, the state ensures the full equality of women with men and prohibits all forms of discrimination against women. The law also contains various provisions related to crimes against women such as rape, abduction, trafficking, domestic violence, and other forms of violence and assault. Despite defector testimonies suggesting weak enforcement of the law in various areas, the establishment of the law does represent a positive step towards the advancement of women's rights in North Korea.

Ongoing abuse

There are various ways through which North Korean women continue to suffer in terms of human rights violations. For instance, domestic violence remains a problem, with some saying it is “so common that it is taken for granted and treated as a private family matter.” According to a 2022 People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE) report, all female defectors interviewed said domestic violence is still common practice in many North Korean households. Even if such incidents are reported to the police, defectors say authorities usually don’t do much and little to no legal support is given to female victims.

Sexual violence against women also remains a serious issue in North Korea. For example, public officers often demand sexual intercourse in return for favors, women are often sexually violated during inspections or search and seizures by officials, female detainees have to undergo strip searches and are often raped, and sexual exploitation against women in the military is also common.

Forced abortions are yet another human rights violation many North Korean women go through. In particular, when repatriated women are found to be pregnant, they are usually forced to undergo an abortion. Infanticide is also known to take place. If repatriated women are in late-term of pregnancy, the baby is killed after it is born in order to maintain a “pure” Korean ethnicity and to punish North Korean women for betraying their country.

The issue of forced repatriation is an issue that has particularly received close attention, especially in recent years. If North Korean women are arrested in China, they are held in detention, undergo interrogation, and are subsequently transferred to the border for repatriation to North Korea. Within North Korea, they are subjected to further, intense investigations under poor conditions and then may face trial or administrative punishment. These women suffer numerous human rights abuses throughout the repatriation and investigation process, including sexual violence, strip searches, and forced abortions, as mentioned above.

In addition, women in North Korea also face discrimination in the education system. In particular, most opportunities for good careers after school are mainly open to those with money and a good family background. Besides this, teachers often tend to favor male students. Many girls reportedly don’t see the need in education since their career options are set by the state (most will receive state-assigned jobs). For example, many girls living in rural areas are being sent to study agriculture in order to improve the country’s food production, meaning they are not able to study what they want. Moreover, even if girls boast high academic achievements, most are not given the opportunity to enroll in advanced classes designed for graduate studies, such as master’s or doctoral programs.

Another struggle North Korean women face relates to labor rights. Although most workers at markets are women, such economic activities have not received official recognition and have been excluded from state protection for 30 years—meaning they are not protected by any labor laws. As a result, women are frequently exposed to personal damage if they fail to respond well against illegal activities such as bribes, frauds, and blackmail. Moreover, many women working in the marketplace are exposed to occupational hazards, physical injury, bullying by authorities and market officials, and sexual violence.

Is change possible?

In order for the human rights situation of North Korean women to markedly and sustainably improve, more must be done by the international community. Although the rights of North Korean women continue to be severely curtailed, a significant level of awareness on the issue has been raised globally thanks to the work of various brave NGOs, the UN, activists, and North Korean escapees themselves.

For this awareness to continue and deepen, the world must maintain a steadfast commitment to human rights advocacy in North Korea. Fostering greater international awareness through media coverage and support for organizations advocating for North Korean women's rights can also continue to bring attention to this issue.

Rather than focusing mainly on sanctions and condemning rhetoric—which has not done much to improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans over the past decade—engagement with North Korean officials through dialogue via international platforms like the UN is critical. North Korea regularly submits reports to various UN agencies and continues to regularly maintain communication with UN officials. With inter-Korean diplomacy and US-DPRK ties at a stalemate, it is crucial to leverage the few communication channels still in place with North Korea.

Supporting educational initiatives and providing resources for women's empowerment programs within North Korea, albeit challenging given the government’s restrictions, could also lay the groundwork for gradual change. Humanitarian aid programs targeted specifically at improving women's access to healthcare and economic opportunities can also make a significant impact.

More can and should be done to support North Korean women living in one of the most oppressive states in the world. Until the day when North Korean women’s rights are fully respected and upheld in practice, continued advocacy, aid, and communication with key actors will remain paramount.

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While it's challenging to predict the specific policy direction a potential second Trump administration would take regarding the Korean Peninsula, valuable insights can be gained by looking back at the roles played by the Trump government in inter-Korean relations between 2017 and 2021.

The following (simplified) analysis is based on research I conducted for my Ph.D. dissertation, titled “The role of the US in inter-Korean relations in the post-Cold War era”.

A rocky start

Trump made his interest in Korean affairs clear from the start, even expressing his willingness to talk with Kim Jong Un before winning the presidency. For example, during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump said that, if elected, he would sit down and negotiate directly with the North Korean leader— signaling his confidence in reaching a denuclearization deal. 

US-North Korea relations did not start off on a good note, however. North Korea launched its first two ICBMs capable of reaching the United States on July 4 and 28, 2017, sharply raising tensions with Washington. Days after the launch, Trump made his infamous “fire and fury” remarks: “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” Trump told reporters on August 8.

Meanwhile, newly-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in made improving inter-Korean relations his administration’s top priority. Moon’s government adopted a strong pro-engagement approach in dealing with the North, similar to the previous Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The main obstacle to improving ties with the North, however, remained the same: the tense relationship between the US and North Korea.

Unlike Moon’s engagement approach, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson unveiled the Trump administration’s North Korea policy in an op-ed in August, saying the Obama era’s “strategic patience” approach was being replaced with “a new policy of strategic accountability.” They called the approach “maximum pressure and engagement.” In reality, the Trump government adopted both “maximum pressure” and “engagement” strategies toward North Korea at different times. 

The US administration made clear that, at least for 2017, the focus would be on a hardline policy and that the goal of any form of engagement would have to be North Korea’s denuclearization. Specifically, the Trump administration’s objectives were deterring a North Korean attack on the US and its allies in the short run and compelling the denuclearization of the regime.

The path to engagement

A path toward diplomatic engagement with North Korea started to appear in 2018 as a result of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s efforts. Moon had managed to secure a visit by a North Korean delegation to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in the South in February. US Vice President Mike Pence also attended the Games, however, no formal meeting took place between the Americans and North Koreans. 

Still, the door to diplomacy had now been opened. Soon after returning to the US, Pence expressed an openness to direct diplomatic discussion with North Korea without prior stipulations. The following month, then-CIA director Mike Pompeo made a secret visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Un to work out the details surrounding the meeting between the two leaders.” 

The first summit meeting between the US and North Korean leaders was scheduled for June, after the North-South summit set for April. What followed was the highlight of engagement with North Korea under the Trump administration. For the first time in history, a sitting US president met with the leader of North Korea. Among other points, the two leaders agreed to the normalization of US–North Korea relations and the building of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Despite the fanfare and high hopes, working-level negotiations following the Singapore summit were difficult to establish. Soon after the summit, Mike Pompeo traveled to Pyongyang in July in pursuit of the Trump administration’s first priority: a full declaration of North Korea’s nuclear activities. North Korea, however, denounced Pompeo for making "gangster-like demands.” As a result, denuclearization talks hit an impasse.

President Moon had to once again step in to try and salvage the negotiating process. Understanding the US need to make progress on the denuclearization front, Moon made the issue a top priority during his September 2018 summit with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. As a result of Moon’s efforts, the two Koreas “agreed on concrete denuclearization measures for the first time” at the summit. This set the foundation for US-DPRK talks to resume.

Kim Jong Un then invited Pompeo to visit Pyongyang in October, and the two sides agreed to arrange a second summit "as soon as possible.” It seemed engagement was still on the table.

Back to containment

Although the second Trump-Kim summit did materialize on February 27-28 in Hanoi, Vietnam, Trump was ultimately unwilling to adopt a phased or more flexible approach toward denuclearization and stuck to his original demands for complete and verifiable denuclearization before providing North Korea with any sanctions relief.

“Out of the eleven UN sanctions resolutions all together, we proposed the lifting of the five groups first from those that were adopted from 2016 to 2017, especially the articles that impede the civilian economy and the people’s livelihood among them,” North Korea’s Foreign Minster Ri Yong Ho said at a press conference in Hanoi. The US side, however, was unwilling to lift sanctions.

Trump also rejected Kim’s proposal to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the talks ultimately broke down. “It was a very productive two days,” Trump said after the meeting, “but sometimes you have to walk, and this was just one of those times.” Similarly, Pompeo stated that "Even the Yongbyon facility and all of its scope — which is important, for sure — still leaves missiles, still leaves warheads and weapons systems.  So there’s a lot of other elements that we just couldn’t get to.”

It was clear that the two parties differed significantly on their definitions of denuclearization as well as on the approach to achieve this goal; while North Korea favored a phased, measured approach, Trump was seeking a “big deal” full capitulation of the North without making concessions. In April, Kim Jong Un said he was willing to meet the US president a third time if Washington made a proposal but set a deadline “until the end of the year” for the US to make a “bold decision.”

After Moon visited Trump in Washington in April to, once again, try and revive the US-North Korea diplomatic process, Trump then traveled to South Korea in June. Before leaving for his trip, the US president sent out a Tweet saying he “would love to meet” Kim Jong-un at the border “just to shake his hand and say hello.” The North Korean side responded favorably, and Kim and Trump met at the DMZ on June 30. That day, Trump became the first sitting US president ever to set foot on North Korean soil when he crossed over the DMZ into the North, albeit for a few moments.

Despite the historic moment and “very good” meeting held between the two leaders, North Korea and the US ultimately failed to get on the same page. North Korean and US officials met again in Stockholm in October,  but the results were the same. North Korea blamed US inflexibility, saying the Americans would not “give up their old viewpoint and attitude.”

North Korea’s deadline passed and Kim announced in January 2020 that his country would no longer be “unilaterally bound” to any former concessions made, including the long-range missile and nuclear test moratorium, and that North Korea would be “chilling [its] efforts for worldwide nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” Kim and Trump exchanged various letters in the following months, but their personal relationship was not enough to resume official diplomatic dialogue.

Ultimately, Trump’s time in office came to an end after pursuing both maximum pressure/containment and engagement strategies. Both, however, failed to lead to lasting positive change in US-DPRK relations, progress on the denuclearization front, or the lasting improvement of inter-Korean ties. 

US roles in inter-Korean relations under Trump

With South Korean President Moon adopting a consistent engagement approach toward North Korea, there was a strong willingness to improve inter-Korean ties in Seoul. The big deciding factor influencing to what extent Moon’s policy would succeed was what policy approach the US under Trump would adopt toward Pyongyang. With Washington making use of both engagement and more hardline, deterrence-centered strategies toward Pyongyang, the roles the US played in inter-Korean relations changed accordingly.

Given the Trump administration’s aggressive rhetoric and strong emphasis on maximum pressure in 2017, it can be said that the US played a ‘spoiling’ role in inter-Korean relations in Trump’s first year in office. With Trump and Kim throwing insults at each other, comparing the size of nuclear buttons, and Washington advocating for maximum pressure, there was no room for inter-Korean relations to progress.

Instead, Moon had to shift his focus away from his inter-Korean goals toward playing a mediating role between Pyongyang and Washington. This was the only way, Moon believed, South-North ties could see improvements. As such, Moon adopted a highly proactive mediating strategy, treading a fine balance between acknowledging US proliferation concerns and North Korean wishes for dialogue with the US. 

It was only after Moon’s efforts in 2017 that the US began switching its North Korea policy. Acknowledging the importance of the US role in inter-Korean relations, Moon adopted a strategy that linked US-DPRK relations with South-North relations. By inviting North Korea to the Pyeongchang Olympics and subsequently sending a South Korean delegation to the North, Moon was able to build trust with Pyongyang and set a foundation for the resumption of US-DPRK talks as well as a third inter-Korean summit.

Overall, in 2018, the US played a ‘facilitating’ role in inter-Korean relations. As progress was made in US-DPRK ties, particularly in the wake of the Singapore Summit, Trump supported Moon’s efforts at improving ties with the North. The US decided not to enforce its own sanctions against North Korea regarding railway inspections while the UN Security Council granted a sanctions exemption that allowed South and North Korea to carry out a joint field survey of railway tracks in the North in November. This had a facilitating impact on inter-Korean ties, with Moon finally being able to move forward with various inter-Korean projects. 

But Washington’s engagement policy did not last. The Trump administration’s role changed once again after the Hanoi Summit. Washington went back to a hardline, non-flexible policy in dealing with Pyongyang, remaining unwilling to change its demands or make any concessions such as sanctions exemptions for inter-Korean projects.

For example, when asked by a reporter on April 11, 2019, if he supported Moon’s push for economic projects with the North, including the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Trump said “this isn’t the right time” to make such concessions. Instead, the US president emphasized that “we want sanctions to remain in place.” This approach had a direct spoiling effect on inter-Korean ties as Moon’s efforts were stalemated due to sanctions and worsening US-DPRK relations. 

Trump’s hardline, pressure-centered strategy continued into 2020. By then, South Korea was no longer able to play the successful role of mediator between North Korea and the US. Trump also showed no support for Moon’s idea to promote individual tourism to North Korea. Strictly prioritizing his “America first” principle, Trump put US national security interests above all else—which, in this case, meant focusing squarely on denuclearizing North Korea. With Trump unwilling to show flexibility in terms of sanctions relief, Washington’s policy once again negatively impacted Moon’s efforts at improving inter-Korean ties. 

Although it can be argued that North Korea was not interested in cooperation with the South and that this also blocked Moon’s efforts, the main reason why Pyongyang lost interest was due to a lack of progress in diplomacy with Washington. Kim’s goal remained to strike a deal with the US to ensure his regime’s security. With the North not getting what it wanted, Kim had little motivation to continue pursuing inter-Korean cooperation.

Despite the progress made in inter-Korean ties in 2018, Moon’s efforts were hit hard by the strong spoiling consequences of Trump’s hardline, containment approach toward North Korea. In other words, it can be concluded that the Trump government played a spoiling role in inter-Korean relations post-Hanoi until the end of Trump’s presidency.

Trump for 2024?

What would become of inter-Korean relations if Trump wins the 2024 US elections? Since Trump strongly prioritized the North Korea issue during his first term in office, he may do so again if reelected. The question then would be, will his administration stick with a North Korea strategy centered around pressure and deterrence or will Trump choose to try engagement again?

But it’s not all up to the US. Even if a Trump government were to choose an engagement approach toward North Korea, inter-Korean relations are unlikely to improve as long as the current Yoon Suk-yeol government sticks with its deterrence-focused North Korea policy. Given the current South Korean government’s preference for containment over engagement with the North, the environment is far less favorable for Trump to make any significant gains on the Korean Peninsula this time around compared to when President Moon was in office.

As a result, Trump may think it wiser to focus his diplomatic resources on the conflict in the Middle East. After all, brokering a peace deal involving Israel and Palestine probably sounds much more enticing to Trump than trying to achieve the seemingly impossible goal of the denuclearization of North Korea.

On the other hand, it may not be Trump at all who is sitting in the Oval Office come January 2025. It could be an entirely different person. Either current President Biden or someone else. If it isn’t Trump, however, the likelihood of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improving any time soon diminishes significantly, as no other president is likely to prioritize the issue as Trump did during his first term. Especially not with the ongoing situation with Russia in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war.

With no indications of a shift in policy by either North or South Korea, the stakes of this year’s US presidential elections are high. If the next US president cannot defuse the ever-worsening security situation on the Peninsula, there could be a much greater conflict to worry about than the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Incompatible Unification Policies

Although inter-Korean relations have not progressed in a positive direction over the past four years, North-South ties reached a new low point on December 31, 2023, when Pyongyang announced a change in the country’s unification policy. According to North Korean media KCNA, Kim Jong-un called for a “decisive policy change” in how the North deals with the South. Kim announced the policy shift at the 9th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), held from Dec. 26-30.

According to the North Korean leader, his country’s policy for national reunification has not had its desired effect, instead “the north-south relations have repeated the vicious cycle of contact and suspension, dialogue and confrontation.” He accused South Korea of pursuing "unification by absorption" and “unification under liberal democracy,” with the goal of the “collapse of the DPRK's regime.” According to Kim, this version of unification sought by the South is not compatible with the North’s version of “national reunification based on one nation and one state with two systems.”

North and South Korea have had their own views on unification ever since the formation of two separate states on the Peninsula in 1948. At that time, it was important for both Koreas to prove their legitimacy as the “true Korean nation.” Particularly in the early years of the Cold War, the main approach was to achieve unification by force. This strategy then changed in the ‘80s with the North proposing the “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” and the South presenting its “Unification Formula for the Korean National Community.”

The South Korean version of unification calls for a 3-step process of reconciliation and cooperation, the formation of a Korean commonwealth, and the realization of a unitary state based on liberal democratic values. On the other hand, the North Korean version of unification calls for the formation of two regional Korean governments that implement policies under the direction of a Confederal government.

The North later amended its proposal in 1991 to a “low stage federation”, saying it would be open to allowing regional governments more autonomy. This brought the unification formulas of the two Koreas closer together, with the leaders of North and South agreeing in the June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration that “there are common elements in the South’s proposal for a confederation and the North’s proposal for a federation of lower stage as the formulae for achieving reunification” and that unification would be pursued in that direction.

Nevertheless, important differences remained in terms of what the final version of a unified state would look like. For the South, it would be “one nation, one state, one system, one government” under a liberal democratic system, while for the North it would be “one nation, one state, two systems, two governments,” which would ensure the continuation of the North’s socialist system. The two formulas for unification have not changed much over the years.

Realizing the disparity in their views, Kim Jong Un described inter-Korean relations at the December Plenary Meeting as “relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states,” arguing that “the reality urgently requires us to adopt a new stand on the north-south relations and the reunification policy.”

The announcement by Pyongyang is significant. Although the North is known to use harsh rhetoric and throw insults at the South Korean government regularly, the latest development goes further by announcing a formal change in the country’s policy line concerning unification with the South. This is the first time the North Korean government publicly declares it will no longer be pursuing unification.

A gradual shift in North Korea’s unification policy is also visible through North Korean propaganda over the past few years, such as its regularly produced posters aimed at the domestic audience. The first three images below (2016) promote unification with the South, emphasizing a Korean-led movement without foreign interference. However, the bottom left image (2019) highlights the importance of self-reliance, while the bottom right image (2022) emphasizes the need to prioritize the development of the country’s national defense capabilities. In other words, more importance is being placed on expanding military capabilities and achieving growth through self-reliance instead of pursuing the goal of reunification.

This situation puts South Korea in a difficult position. Unlike the North, South Korea cannot openly denounce the goal of unification since it is enshrined in the country’s Constitution (Article 4: “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.”). South Korean Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho reiterated this stance on Jan. 2, saying the South will continue to “prepare for unification in earnest,” while warning that the North will not be able to overcome the US-ROK ‘wall’ of deterrence.

Although the Constitution calls for unification to be pursued ‘peacefully’, North Korea accuses the South of adhering to the so-called ‘unification by absorption policy’, which would see the North Korean government collapse and the two Koreas reunited by South Korea ‘absorbing’ the North and forming one nation under the South Korean system. Even though each government in the South states its goal of achieving unification through peaceful means, wording used in various unification-related documents over the years rejects the idea of a unified Korean state that includes the presence of the current North Korean governing system.

For example, one 2012 report on unification states that “the authoritarian and totalitarian systems that still remain on the Korean Peninsula must be eliminated,” pointing to the North Korean system. Moreover, regarding the current government, the 2023 Unification Ministry’s White Paper on Korean Unification states that the Yoon administration’s priority is to “denuclearize North Korea” (not the Korean Peninsula), while aiming for “peaceful unification based on a basic free and democratic order.” Meanwhile, the first sentence on the Korea Institute for National Reunification (KINU)’s current homepage states that “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands,” in accordance with the South Korean Constitution—underscoring the view that sees the South as the only legitimate Korea and the territory in the northern half of the Peninsula as belonging to South Korea.

North Korea sees this position as incompatible with its vision for a unified Korea and has therefore given up, at least for now, on the goal of unification. Instead, North Korea will likely prioritize further strengthening its military capabilities while deepening ties with traditional allies such as Russia and China. Regarding the latter, Kim Jong Un mentioned at the Plenary Meeting his plans of “further developing the relations with the anti-imperialist independent countries opposed to the hegemony strategy of the U.S. and the West.” In short, improving relations with South Korea is not on the priority list.

“Peace through strength”

As is the case in the North, the current South Korean government does not seem to be prioritizing unification at the moment. The Yoon government has designated North Korea as the South’s “main enemy” and is vowing to double down on its hardline, deterrence-centered strategy in 2024.

“Korea will build peace through strength. It will not be a submissive peace that is dependent on the good will of the adversary,” President Yoon said in his 2024 New Year Address. In terms of what this approach looks like in practice, the South Korean president explained: “We will accelerate our efforts to build a stronger ROK 3K Defense System to defend against North Korean nuclear and missile threats.”

The 3K Defense System refers to the Kill Chain system, the Korea Air and Missile Defense system, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan. The Kill Chain system is particularly controversial as it aims to launch a preemptive strike to remove the North Korean leadership in the face of an imminent nuclear attack.

Unlike the previous Moon Jae-in administration, the Yoon government has taken a more hardline stance toward the North, favoring military deterrence over diplomacy. Pyongyang has made its displeasure at the Yoon administration clear from the beginning, insulting the South Korean president on various occasions and calling his plans for denuclearization of the North in exchange for economic aid “the height of absurdity.”

Since coming to office, President Yoon has prioritized deepening ties with the US and Japan and strengthening deterrence aimed at North Korea. Steps toward the latter were solidified in July when Yoon and US President Joe Biden launched the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) aimed at strengthening extended deterrence, discussing nuclear and strategic planning, and ‘managing the threat to the nonproliferation regime’ posed by North Korea. Yoon also highlighted the NCG in his New Year’s speech, saying that the US and South Korea have now established a “nuclear-based” military alliance.

The NCG has further driven a wedge between North and South Korea, with Pyongyang seeing it as yet another hostile move by Washington and Seoul. In Kim Jong-un’s opinion, the NCG is “aimed at the joint plan and execution for the use of nuclear weapons” by the US and ROK and is bringing the two Koreas closer to war. The North Korean leader also heavily criticized Yoon’s decision to “complete the enhanced ROK-U.S. extended deterrence system” by the first half of 2024.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry is also echoing the same hardline policy approach. “The government will craft a 'thicker and more elevated' deterrence system through the strengthening of the Seoul-Washington alliance in order to brace for Pyongyang's potential military provocations," South Korea’s Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said on Jan. 2. The Unification Minister is known for his hardline stance toward the North, having said in 2019 that unification would only be possible once the North’s government “is overthrown and North Korea is liberated."

A “golden opportunity” for Pyongyang?

North Korea has repeatedly criticized the Yoon administration, seeing the current South Korean government’s strategy as one more likely to result in conflict than reconciliation. Pyongyang made its stance vis-à-vis the Yoon government explictly clear on Jan. 2 through a statement made by Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister. The message was specifically directed at the South Korean president, with the title of the statement reading "New Year message to the president of the Republic of Korea.”

Kim Yo Jong strongly criticized Yoon’s “peace by force” approach toward the North and mocked the South’s policy for being counterproductive by giving the North all the justification it needs to further grow its military and nuclear capabilities. “Thanks to the frequent introduction of U.S. nuclear carriers, nuclear submarines and nuclear strategic bombers allegedly to frighten anyone, the DPRK could develop its military capabilities in a reasonable and effective way,” she argued.

She called Yoon’s presidency a “golden opportunity” for North Korea and a “valuable gift,” adding that if the opposition candidate would have won in the 2022 presidential elections,  it would have been “a serious trouble to us.”

“The tremendous military muscle we are so satisfied with and trust in may have been hard to be secured in such a short span of time without the military confrontation attitude that Yoon showed so wildly and his clamoring for ‘collapse’ of our country and ‘punishment’.”

Similarly, critics of the Yoon administration’s North Korea approach claim the South’s policy is increasing the risk of conflict, giving North Korea time to further develop its nuclear and missile programs, and making diplomacy impossible. Kim Yo Jong called on Yoon to continue his current policy line, as his current approach is helping “bolster up the military muscle of the DPRK.”

A dangerous year ahead

With unification goals off the table—at least for now—North Korea is likely to take a much more aggressive stance against the South this year. Signs of heightened tensions are already becoming apparent, with South Korea claiming the North conducted live-fire drills near the Western border with the South for three consecutive days over the weekend. In a report published by KCNA on Sunday, however, Kim Yo Jong refuted Seoul’s claims, saying instead that the North “conducted a deceptive operation in order to assess the real detecting ability of the ROK military gangsters” and that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) had in fact detonated “blasting powder” simulating the sound of artillery.

Regardless, the tendency of the South to respond in kind to North Korean provocations does not bode well for the stability of the Peninsula or the wider region. This is especially so now that the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement has practically been scrapped. With neither side showing any signs of softening their approach to each other, 2024 will likely see tensions between the Koreas continue to rise, perhaps to new heights.

This year’s presidential elections in the US are also likely to spur increased military actions by North Korea, including a possible nuclear test. Even if Donald Trump is reelected, inter-Korean ties are unlikely to progress in a positive direction this year. The new US president would have to make a major shift in Washington’s North Korea policy, away from a deterrence-centered strategy toward one prioritizing engagement, the resumption of diplomacy, and arms control instead of denuclearization. North Korea will remain uninterested in diplomacy as long as the US’ current policy remains unchanged. The same is true for its stance toward South Korea.

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The military coup of 1979 in South Korea has been garnering significant attention in recent weeks with the newly released film “12/12: The Day” (서울의 봄). The movie depicts the nine-hour military operation that took place on December 12 that catapulted Chun Doo-hwan to power. The coup was an unwelcome event to many who had hoped the death of Park Chung-hee would finally pave the way for democracy to take root in the country. Contrary to those wishes, military dictatorship continued for another seven years and brought with it some of the darkest periods in South Korea’s history. 44 years after this infamous coup, it is worth taking a look back at what led to the events that culminated on December 12 and the impact the coup had on the course of South Korea’s history.

Assassination of Park Chung-hee

The events that led to the coup began on October 26, 1979, when then-President Park Chung-hee was assassinated. Park himself had risen to power through a 1961 coup and ruled the country with an iron fist, adopting a zero-tolerance policy for any semblance of communism or dissent against his government. As the years went on, Park’s governing style became increasingly ruthless, with his government implementing the infamous Yusin Constitution in 1972. The document was adopted after Park dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the original constitution. The Yusin Constitution ushered in a new era of authoritarian rule in South Korea, vesting Park with sweeping powers including unlimited terms in office and the ability to handpick a significant number of members of the National Assembly, ensuring a majority for his party. An electoral college system for presidential elections was introduced and Park gave himself the power to issue ‘emergency decrees’ whenever he saw fit, leading to a range of repressive policies that left his presidency with a dark human rights record.

Unsurprisingly, many people were unhappy with Park and the Yusin Constitution. In the weeks leading up to his assassination, protests had broken out in the cities of Busan and Masan—the so-called BuMa demonstrations. Fuelled by a desire for a new era, thousands of students joined protests against the Yusin system. The government’s response was stern, with martial law being imposed in Busan on October 18. Universities were closed, marines deployed to the campus of Pusan National University, thousands of students arrested, and hundreds sent to courts to face ‘trials’.

While the US watched the situation carefully, Ambassador William H. Gleysteen said he did not believe the Park government was “on its last legs or anywhere near it” and underscored to his superiors in Washington that “we obviously should not exacerbate the situation by our actions”. Notably, the US was already aware at this time of the possibility of further (student) protests spreading to other cities including Daegu, Gwangju, and Jeonju.

The protests were also a main topic of conversation at the dinner where Park would ultimately be assassinated.

On the evening of October 26, Park sat down for what would be his final meal with his chief bodyguard Cha Ji-chul, KCIA Director Kim Jae-gyu, and chief Blue House secretary and former KCIA director Kim Gye-won at the KCIA annex in the Blue House compound. At the dinner, Cha called on President Park to deploy forces to quell the protesters in Busan and Masan—a comment that angered Kim.

Kim reportedly believed that Cha was feeding Park negative information about him and Kim suspected that the President was contemplating dismissing him due to his inability to manage the opposition party and its leader, Kim Young-sam. The situation became even more heated as Park criticized Kim for failing to quell the protests in the two cities. It is around this time that Kim is believed to have left the table to get his pistol, after which he shot both Cha and Park. Both the President and his chief bodyguard died that day.

Kim Jae-gyu was indicted on charges of “homicide for the purpose of insurrection” and “attempted orchestration of insurrection.” In custody, he reportedly told investigators that he tried to inform Park that the protestors were angry citizens and that only a minority were students. According to Kim, he feared the discontent would spread into a nationwide revolt. Regardless of his motives, Kim was sentenced to death and executed on May 24, 1980. What happened between the assassination and Kim’s end, however, changed South Korean history forever.

Chun Doo-hwan, the Hanahoe, and Washington’s stance

After Park’s death, Major General Chun Doo-hwan, head of the Defense Security Command (DSC), was tasked as chief investigator of the assasination. Chun already held significant power and influence given his position; the DSC served as an intelligence agency within the military, mainly to weed out those harboring anti-government sentiment— a process that often included illegal arrests, torture, intimidation, and a range of other distasteful acts. Chun had stayed close to President Park ever since the 1961 coup; the relationship was so close that Chun often referred to Park as “father”. Given his close ties with Park, Chun handpicked a group to investigate what exactly happened to the former President, suspecting a possible conspiracy.

Chun particularly suspected the role of Chung Seung-hwa, Army Chief of Staff and newly-appointed martial law commander, due to his ‘suspicious’ behavior the night of the assassination. Despite the lack of proof of a connection between Chung and the crime, Chun was not convinced. To add to his suspicions, he had been informed about rumors that Chung was planning to retire or reassign several officers and that he then planned on taking power himself. Chun was reportedly one of the officers Chung was seeking to send away. Despite these being mere rumors, Chun had now linked his own survival with the need to remove Chung.

But Chun was not acting alone. He had surrounded himself with only those most loyal to him, members of the so-called Hanahoe (하나회). The group was formed by the Korean Military Academy (KMA) class of 1963, led by Chun and Roh Tae-woo. The group’s influence grew when Chun and Roh became generals in 1973. Under Park Chung-hee, members of the Hanahoe were promoted far faster than other officers and were given more important positions. Many Hanahoe members were distrustful of the political system, which they saw as rife with corruption, and were highly critical of opposition politicians Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. The young officers were also unhappy with what they saw as incompetent senior military officials who stifled the military’s efficiency and made it harder for younger, more talented officers to get promotions.

These concerns, paired with the urgent and uncertain situation following Park's death, provided fertile ground for Chun's coup idea. His Hanahoe colleagues also agreed on the need to remove Chung after Chun shared the rumors he had heard. The group quickly got to work on planning the coup.

Meanwhile, the US remained relatively optimistic about the situation in Korea. Washington was well aware of the recent student demonstrations but did not view them as a major threat and did not believe the Park government would come to an end soon. In an October 28 memo written by Gleysteen to Washington, the US Ambassador said he believed the Korean military would remain “relatively unified” given the threat of North Korea and the fear of ‘alienating’ elements of Korean society. He urged the US to adopt a position of restraint, arguing that “since the 1960s, US pressures on Korea have accumulated to the point where we could face an extremely unhealthy anti-American reaction should we press too hard and too crassly to bring about structural change.” 

A similar laid-back attitude was conveyed in a November 3 meeting between US officials and South Korean Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin. At the meeting, Park emphasized the need to avoid a military takeover, expressing his concern given the many factions in the military. In an attempt to reassure Park, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke said he spoke to Wickham the previous day, and that “he sensed no desire on the part of the armed forces to assume control”. Park remained wary, also doubting the ability of acting-president Choi Kyu-hah to hold things together, calling him a “relatively inactive man, who prefers to follow rather than to lead”. Park’s fears ultimately proved to be well-founded.

12/12

The coup did not come as a complete surprise to the US. Weeks before the coup, General John A. Wickham, Commander of the US Forces in Korea, UN Command, and US-ROK Combined Forces Command, received information from various sources about younger generals being unhappy about the transition process in the wake of Park’s death.

“The younger generals believed that America's policies were encouraging the liberalization of the media and the outspokenness of the opposition leaders. The officers were also openly bitter about the corruption in the government and business community, and they were restless over the prospect that the current military power structure would remain in place and inhibit their own promotion prospects,” Wickham wrote in his 1999 memoir.

Wickham notified South Korea’s Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun and Deputy Commander in Chief Ryu Byung-hyun, but both dismissed the information as being a mere rumor and took no further action. As a result, the path was clear for Chun to go ahead with the coup.

To be able to successfully carry out the coup, Chun knew he had to first deal with Chung. He planned to have him arrested the night of the coup. While Chun sent interrogators to Chung’s home that night, those loyal to Chung were invited to a dinner in western Seoul. This way, there was no one Chung could call or turn to when the officers turned up at his house. Chun’s plan worked. While Chung was being taken care of, Chun deployed multiple military units to take control of the capital.

There is much debate on whether the US could have done more to try and stop the coup or prevent it altogether. Some argue that Wickham had six full hours to take action the night of the coup but he instead urged Roh to wait until daybreak to avoid a “mistaken collision”. Even though Wickham acknowledged that “a military coup was a complete reversal of everything President Carter had tried to accomplish” he still called for “a hands-off response”.

In reality, the US was dealing with another major diplomatic issue at the same time. The Iran hostage crisis greatly impacted the way the Carter administration looked at the situation in Korea. Holbrooke made it clear to Gleysteen in a telegram sent on December 4, 1979, that “Nobody wants another Iran” and strongly discouraged any “American action which would in any way appear to unravel a situation and lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally”. In short, it seems that the Carter administration prioritized US national security interests over the democratic aspirations of the Korean population.

Aftermath

Once Defense Minister Roh gave into Chun’s coup, President-Elect Choi formally acquiesced as well and the coup was practically over by dawn. Wickham was not pleased with the situation, despite having argued for a “hands-off” approach. “The insurgent group and those who follow them have betrayed U.S. trust and jeopardized U.S. as well as ROK security interests,” Wickham reported to his superiors two weeks after the coup.

In an attempt to ease US concerns, Chun insisted that he intended to allow elections to take place and reassured US officials he had no interest in going into politics and would soon go back to being a soldier. In reality, however, holding elections at that time would have gone against the aspirations of Chun and his group as they did not support either Kim Dae-jung or Kim Young-sam, seeing them as being ill-equipped to run the country.

There was also discontent present within the military, with some officials even bringing Wickham a proposal for a counter-coup. Wickham declined the offer, however, saying that "the United States is not in the business of supporting coups and absolutely would not support any counteraction by the military faction he represented or any other faction." Wickham’s immediate priority was to ensure stability in the South to prevent any possible infiltration or sudden attack by the North. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two weeks after the Korean coup also made it more important than ever for the US to maintain stability on the southern half of the Peninsula. The US thus chose to accept the situation and focused on dealing with Chun in a way that would prevent further security threats and maintain stability.

Democracy Postponed

The consequences of the 12/12 coup were immediate and severe. Military dictatorship was prolonged and the people’s wish for democracy was suppressed in a brutal way. With the academic semester starting again in March, student protests against the Chun-led regime broke out throughout the country. Still, in a telegram sent to Washington by Gleysteen that same month, he expressed his hope that “General Chun and like-minded military officers will restrain themselves while politicians work out compromises that will allow at least some progress in the current ROK experiment in political liberalization,” signaling his ongoing optimism about the situation. But things did not turn out that way.

With his history as the head of the DSC, Chun was not one to hesitate when it came to using illegal methods to remove anything he saw as an obstacle. The full force of his ruthless ways would be on full display in May 1980 in the city of Gwangju.

Military tanks and soldiers were deployed and indiscriminately targeted students and other civilians, killing and injuring many during what came to be known as the “Gwangju Uprising”. According to official figures, 167 persons were killed and over 2,600 injured. Other estimates, however, suggest over 2,000 lost their lives.

Chun had already taken control of the KCIA in April and later became president in September in an election by the electoral council (the National Conference for Unification). Chun would serve as South Korea’s president until 1987, when he was succeeded by his close friend Roh Tae-woo. It was only after Roh’s presidency that democracy finally made its way to South Korea with the election of President Kim Young-sam.

This dark episode in South Korea’s history has left me with several questions.

• What if Defense Minister Roh had taken Wickham’s warnings more seriously? Would the senior military officials have been able to conduct an investigation that would have led to the foiling of the coup plot?

• What about the role of acting president Choi? What if he had taken on a more stern position and done more to block potential threats to the peaceful transition of power? 

Despite the many what-ifs, history has been written and the events transpired the way they did. In the end, South Korea did become a democratic nation, but its people suffered immeasurable pain and trauma in the process.

It is this process that must never be forgotten.

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