The Donald Trump administration's approach to inter-Korean relations
The Donald Trump administration's approach to inter-Korean relations
Could a second Trump presidency help revive inter-Korean ties?
After securing victories in the primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire, it appears increasingly likely that former US President Donald Trump will be chosen as the Republican Party's nominee for the presidency. This also raises the possibility for him to secure a second term in office and resume diplomatic initiatives with North Korea. If Trump does decide to once again prioritize the Korean issue, what would this mean for the rapidly worsening state of inter-Korean relations? Would a second Trump presidency help defuse tensions on the Peninsula or further aggravate the situation?
While it's challenging to predict the specific policy direction a potential second Trump administration would take regarding the Korean Peninsula, valuable insights can be gained by looking back at the roles played by the Trump government in inter-Korean relations between 2017 and 2021.
The following (simplified) analysis is based on research I conducted for my Ph.D. dissertation, titled “The role of the US in inter-Korean relations in the post-Cold War era”.
A rocky start
Trump made his interest in Korean affairs clear from the start, even expressing his willingness to talk with Kim Jong Un before winning the presidency. For example, during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump said that, if elected, he would sit down and negotiate directly with the North Korean leader— signaling his confidence in reaching a denuclearization deal.
US-North Korea relations did not start off on a good note, however. North Korea launched its first two ICBMs capable of reaching the United States on July 4 and 28, 2017, sharply raising tensions with Washington. Days after the launch, Trump made his infamous “fire and fury” remarks: “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” Trump told reporters on August 8.
Meanwhile, newly-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in made improving inter-Korean relations his administration’s top priority. Moon’s government adopted a strong pro-engagement approach in dealing with the North, similar to the previous Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The main obstacle to improving ties with the North, however, remained the same: the tense relationship between the US and North Korea.
Unlike Moon’s engagement approach, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson unveiled the Trump administration’s North Korea policy in an op-ed in August, saying the Obama era’s “strategic patience” approach was being replaced with “a new policy of strategic accountability.” They called the approach “maximum pressure and engagement.” In reality, the Trump government adopted both “maximum pressure” and “engagement” strategies toward North Korea at different times.
The US administration made clear that, at least for 2017, the focus would be on a hardline policy and that the goal of any form of engagement would have to be North Korea’s denuclearization. Specifically, the Trump administration’s objectives were deterring a North Korean attack on the US and its allies in the short run and compelling the denuclearization of the regime.
Overall, the first year of Trump’s presidency can be called a “deterrence phase” that put more emphasis on containment than engagement with North Korea. As a result, the US did not help push the two Koreas toward reconciliation or the improvement of ties.
The path to engagement
A path toward diplomatic engagement with North Korea started to appear in 2018 as a result of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s efforts. Moon had managed to secure a visit by a North Korean delegation to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in the South in February. US Vice President Mike Pence also attended the Games, however, no formal meeting took place between the Americans and North Koreans.
Still, the door to diplomacy had now been opened. Soon after returning to the US, Pence expressed an openness to direct diplomatic discussion with North Korea without prior stipulations. The following month, then-CIA director Mike Pompeo made a secret visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Un to work out the details surrounding the meeting between the two leaders.”
The first summit meeting between the US and North Korean leaders was scheduled for June, after the North-South summit set for April. What followed was the highlight of engagement with North Korea under the Trump administration. For the first time in history, a sitting US president met with the leader of North Korea. Among other points, the two leaders agreed to the normalization of US–North Korea relations and the building of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
Despite the fanfare and high hopes, working-level negotiations following the Singapore summit were difficult to establish. Soon after the summit, Mike Pompeo traveled to Pyongyang in July in pursuit of the Trump administration’s first priority: a full declaration of North Korea’s nuclear activities. North Korea, however, denounced Pompeo for making "gangster-like demands.” As a result, denuclearization talks hit an impasse.
President Moon had to once again step in to try and salvage the negotiating process. Understanding the US need to make progress on the denuclearization front, Moon made the issue a top priority during his September 2018 summit with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. As a result of Moon’s efforts, the two Koreas “agreed on concrete denuclearization measures for the first time” at the summit. This set the foundation for US-DPRK talks to resume.
Kim Jong Un then invited Pompeo to visit Pyongyang in October, and the two sides agreed to arrange a second summit "as soon as possible.” It seemed engagement was still on the table.
Largely thanks to President Moon’s efforts, the Trump administration switched its North Korea policy toward one favoring engagement in 2018. US-DPRK relations made strides in a positive direction and the possibility of achieving peace on the Peninsula began to rise.
Back to containment
Although the second Trump-Kim summit did materialize on February 27-28 in Hanoi, Vietnam, Trump was ultimately unwilling to adopt a phased or more flexible approach toward denuclearization and stuck to his original demands for complete and verifiable denuclearization before providing North Korea with any sanctions relief.
“Out of the eleven UN sanctions resolutions all together, we proposed the lifting of the five groups first from those that were adopted from 2016 to 2017, especially the articles that impede the civilian economy and the people’s livelihood among them,” North Korea’s Foreign Minster Ri Yong Ho said at a press conference in Hanoi. The US side, however, was unwilling to lift sanctions.
Trump also rejected Kim’s proposal to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the talks ultimately broke down. “It was a very productive two days,” Trump said after the meeting, “but sometimes you have to walk, and this was just one of those times.” Similarly, Pompeo stated that "Even the Yongbyon facility and all of its scope — which is important, for sure — still leaves missiles, still leaves warheads and weapons systems. So there’s a lot of other elements that we just couldn’t get to.”
It was clear that the two parties differed significantly on their definitions of denuclearization as well as on the approach to achieve this goal; while North Korea favored a phased, measured approach, Trump was seeking a “big deal” full capitulation of the North without making concessions. In April, Kim Jong Un said he was willing to meet the US president a third time if Washington made a proposal but set a deadline “until the end of the year” for the US to make a “bold decision.”
After Moon visited Trump in Washington in April to, once again, try and revive the US-North Korea diplomatic process, Trump then traveled to South Korea in June. Before leaving for his trip, the US president sent out a Tweet saying he “would love to meet” Kim Jong-un at the border “just to shake his hand and say hello.” The North Korean side responded favorably, and Kim and Trump met at the DMZ on June 30. That day, Trump became the first sitting US president ever to set foot on North Korean soil when he crossed over the DMZ into the North, albeit for a few moments.
Despite the historic moment and “very good” meeting held between the two leaders, North Korea and the US ultimately failed to get on the same page. North Korean and US officials met again in Stockholm in October, but the results were the same. North Korea blamed US inflexibility, saying the Americans would not “give up their old viewpoint and attitude.”
North Korea’s deadline passed and Kim announced in January 2020 that his country would no longer be “unilaterally bound” to any former concessions made, including the long-range missile and nuclear test moratorium, and that North Korea would be “chilling [its] efforts for worldwide nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” Kim and Trump exchanged various letters in the following months, but their personal relationship was not enough to resume official diplomatic dialogue.
Ultimately, Trump’s time in office came to an end after pursuing both maximum pressure/containment and engagement strategies. Both, however, failed to lead to lasting positive change in US-DPRK relations, progress on the denuclearization front, or the lasting improvement of inter-Korean ties.
The brief switch in the Trump administration’s North Korea strategy did not last and Washington soon returned to an approach favoring maximum pressure. The breakdown of diplomacy post-Hanoi negatively impacted both US-DPRK and inter-Korean relations.
US roles in inter-Korean relations under Trump
With South Korean President Moon adopting a consistent engagement approach toward North Korea, there was a strong willingness to improve inter-Korean ties in Seoul. The big deciding factor influencing to what extent Moon’s policy would succeed was what policy approach the US under Trump would adopt toward Pyongyang. With Washington making use of both engagement and more hardline, deterrence-centered strategies toward Pyongyang, the roles the US played in inter-Korean relations changed accordingly.
Given the Trump administration’s aggressive rhetoric and strong emphasis on maximum pressure in 2017, it can be said that the US played a ‘spoiling’ role in inter-Korean relations in Trump’s first year in office. With Trump and Kim throwing insults at each other, comparing the size of nuclear buttons, and Washington advocating for maximum pressure, there was no room for inter-Korean relations to progress.
Instead, Moon had to shift his focus away from his inter-Korean goals toward playing a mediating role between Pyongyang and Washington. This was the only way, Moon believed, South-North ties could see improvements. As such, Moon adopted a highly proactive mediating strategy, treading a fine balance between acknowledging US proliferation concerns and North Korean wishes for dialogue with the US.
It was only after Moon’s efforts in 2017 that the US began switching its North Korea policy. Acknowledging the importance of the US role in inter-Korean relations, Moon adopted a strategy that linked US-DPRK relations with South-North relations. By inviting North Korea to the Pyeongchang Olympics and subsequently sending a South Korean delegation to the North, Moon was able to build trust with Pyongyang and set a foundation for the resumption of US-DPRK talks as well as a third inter-Korean summit.
Overall, in 2018, the US played a ‘facilitating’ role in inter-Korean relations. As progress was made in US-DPRK ties, particularly in the wake of the Singapore Summit, Trump supported Moon’s efforts at improving ties with the North. The US decided not to enforce its own sanctions against North Korea regarding railway inspections while the UN Security Council granted a sanctions exemption that allowed South and North Korea to carry out a joint field survey of railway tracks in the North in November. This had a facilitating impact on inter-Korean ties, with Moon finally being able to move forward with various inter-Korean projects.
But Washington’s engagement policy did not last. The Trump administration’s role changed once again after the Hanoi Summit. Washington went back to a hardline, non-flexible policy in dealing with Pyongyang, remaining unwilling to change its demands or make any concessions such as sanctions exemptions for inter-Korean projects.
For example, when asked by a reporter on April 11, 2019, if he supported Moon’s push for economic projects with the North, including the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Trump said “this isn’t the right time” to make such concessions. Instead, the US president emphasized that “we want sanctions to remain in place.” This approach had a direct spoiling effect on inter-Korean ties as Moon’s efforts were stalemated due to sanctions and worsening US-DPRK relations.
Trump’s hardline, pressure-centered strategy continued into 2020. By then, South Korea was no longer able to play the successful role of mediator between North Korea and the US. Trump also showed no support for Moon’s idea to promote individual tourism to North Korea. Strictly prioritizing his “America first” principle, Trump put US national security interests above all else—which, in this case, meant focusing squarely on denuclearizing North Korea. With Trump unwilling to show flexibility in terms of sanctions relief, Washington’s policy once again negatively impacted Moon’s efforts at improving inter-Korean ties.
Although it can be argued that North Korea was not interested in cooperation with the South and that this also blocked Moon’s efforts, the main reason why Pyongyang lost interest was due to a lack of progress in diplomacy with Washington. Kim’s goal remained to strike a deal with the US to ensure his regime’s security. With the North not getting what it wanted, Kim had little motivation to continue pursuing inter-Korean cooperation.
Despite the progress made in inter-Korean ties in 2018, Moon’s efforts were hit hard by the strong spoiling consequences of Trump’s hardline, containment approach toward North Korea. In other words, it can be concluded that the Trump government played a spoiling role in inter-Korean relations post-Hanoi until the end of Trump’s presidency.
Trump for 2024?
What would become of inter-Korean relations if Trump wins the 2024 US elections? Since Trump strongly prioritized the North Korea issue during his first term in office, he may do so again if reelected. The question then would be, will his administration stick with a North Korea strategy centered around pressure and deterrence or will Trump choose to try engagement again?
But it’s not all up to the US. Even if a Trump government were to choose an engagement approach toward North Korea, inter-Korean relations are unlikely to improve as long as the current Yoon Suk-yeol government sticks with its deterrence-focused North Korea policy. Given the current South Korean government’s preference for containment over engagement with the North, the environment is far less favorable for Trump to make any significant gains on the Korean Peninsula this time around compared to when President Moon was in office.
As a result, Trump may think it wiser to focus his diplomatic resources on the conflict in the Middle East. After all, brokering a peace deal involving Israel and Palestine probably sounds much more enticing to Trump than trying to achieve the seemingly impossible goal of the denuclearization of North Korea.
On the other hand, it may not be Trump at all who is sitting in the Oval Office come January 2025. It could be an entirely different person. Either current President Biden or someone else. If it isn’t Trump, however, the likelihood of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improving any time soon diminishes significantly, as no other president is likely to prioritize the issue as Trump did during his first term. Especially not with the ongoing situation with Russia in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war.
With no indications of a shift in policy by either North or South Korea, the stakes of this year’s US presidential elections are high. If the next US president cannot defuse the ever-worsening security situation on the Peninsula, there could be a much greater conflict to worry about than the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.