The Road to 12/12: A Closer Look at South Korea's 1979 Military Coup
The Road to 12/12: A Closer Look at South Korea's 1979 Military Coup
The rise of Chun Doo-hwan and the postponement of South Korean democracy.
The military coup of 1979 in South Korea has been garnering significant attention in recent weeks with the newly released film “12/12: The Day” (서울의 봄). The movie depicts the nine-hour military operation that took place on December 12 that catapulted Chun Doo-hwan to power. The coup was an unwelcome event to many who had hoped the death of Park Chung-hee would finally pave the way for democracy to take root in the country. Contrary to those wishes, military dictatorship continued for another seven years and brought with it some of the darkest periods in South Korea’s history. 44 years after this infamous coup, it is worth taking a look back at what led to the events that culminated on December 12 and the impact the coup had on the course of South Korea’s history.
Assassination of Park Chung-hee
The events that led to the coup began on October 26, 1979, when then-President Park Chung-hee was assassinated. Park himself had risen to power through a 1961 coup and ruled the country with an iron fist, adopting a zero-tolerance policy for any semblance of communism or dissent against his government. As the years went on, Park’s governing style became increasingly ruthless, with his government implementing the infamous Yusin Constitution in 1972. The document was adopted after Park dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the original constitution. The Yusin Constitution ushered in a new era of authoritarian rule in South Korea, vesting Park with sweeping powers including unlimited terms in office and the ability to handpick a significant number of members of the National Assembly, ensuring a majority for his party. An electoral college system for presidential elections was introduced and Park gave himself the power to issue ‘emergency decrees’ whenever he saw fit, leading to a range of repressive policies that left his presidency with a dark human rights record.
Unsurprisingly, many people were unhappy with Park and the Yusin Constitution. In the weeks leading up to his assassination, protests had broken out in the cities of Busan and Masan—the so-called BuMa demonstrations. Fuelled by a desire for a new era, thousands of students joined protests against the Yusin system. The government’s response was stern, with martial law being imposed in Busan on October 18. Universities were closed, marines deployed to the campus of Pusan National University, thousands of students arrested, and hundreds sent to courts to face ‘trials’.
While the US watched the situation carefully, Ambassador William H. Gleysteen said he did not believe the Park government was “on its last legs or anywhere near it” and underscored to his superiors in Washington that “we obviously should not exacerbate the situation by our actions”. Notably, the US was already aware at this time of the possibility of further (student) protests spreading to other cities including Daegu, Gwangju, and Jeonju.
The protests were also a main topic of conversation at the dinner where Park would ultimately be assassinated.
On the evening of October 26, Park sat down for what would be his final meal with his chief bodyguard Cha Ji-chul, KCIA Director Kim Jae-gyu, and chief Blue House secretary and former KCIA director Kim Gye-won at the KCIA annex in the Blue House compound. At the dinner, Cha called on President Park to deploy forces to quell the protesters in Busan and Masan—a comment that angered Kim.
Kim reportedly believed that Cha was feeding Park negative information about him and Kim suspected that the President was contemplating dismissing him due to his inability to manage the opposition party and its leader, Kim Young-sam. The situation became even more heated as Park criticized Kim for failing to quell the protests in the two cities. It is around this time that Kim is believed to have left the table to get his pistol, after which he shot both Cha and Park. Both the President and his chief bodyguard died that day.
Kim Jae-gyu was indicted on charges of “homicide for the purpose of insurrection” and “attempted orchestration of insurrection.” In custody, he reportedly told investigators that he tried to inform Park that the protestors were angry citizens and that only a minority were students. According to Kim, he feared the discontent would spread into a nationwide revolt. Regardless of his motives, Kim was sentenced to death and executed on May 24, 1980. What happened between the assassination and Kim’s end, however, changed South Korean history forever.
Chun Doo-hwan, the Hanahoe, and Washington’s stance
After Park’s death, Major General Chun Doo-hwan, head of the Defense Security Command (DSC), was tasked as chief investigator of the assasination. Chun already held significant power and influence given his position; the DSC served as an intelligence agency within the military, mainly to weed out those harboring anti-government sentiment— a process that often included illegal arrests, torture, intimidation, and a range of other distasteful acts. Chun had stayed close to President Park ever since the 1961 coup; the relationship was so close that Chun often referred to Park as “father”. Given his close ties with Park, Chun handpicked a group to investigate what exactly happened to the former President, suspecting a possible conspiracy.
Chun particularly suspected the role of Chung Seung-hwa, Army Chief of Staff and newly-appointed martial law commander, due to his ‘suspicious’ behavior the night of the assassination. Despite the lack of proof of a connection between Chung and the crime, Chun was not convinced. To add to his suspicions, he had been informed about rumors that Chung was planning to retire or reassign several officers and that he then planned on taking power himself. Chun was reportedly one of the officers Chung was seeking to send away. Despite these being mere rumors, Chun had now linked his own survival with the need to remove Chung.
But Chun was not acting alone. He had surrounded himself with only those most loyal to him, members of the so-called Hanahoe (하나회). The group was formed by the Korean Military Academy (KMA) class of 1963, led by Chun and Roh Tae-woo. The group’s influence grew when Chun and Roh became generals in 1973. Under Park Chung-hee, members of the Hanahoe were promoted far faster than other officers and were given more important positions. Many Hanahoe members were distrustful of the political system, which they saw as rife with corruption, and were highly critical of opposition politicians Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. The young officers were also unhappy with what they saw as incompetent senior military officials who stifled the military’s efficiency and made it harder for younger, more talented officers to get promotions.
These concerns, paired with the urgent and uncertain situation following Park's death, provided fertile ground for Chun's coup idea. His Hanahoe colleagues also agreed on the need to remove Chung after Chun shared the rumors he had heard. The group quickly got to work on planning the coup.
Meanwhile, the US remained relatively optimistic about the situation in Korea. Washington was well aware of the recent student demonstrations but did not view them as a major threat and did not believe the Park government would come to an end soon. In an October 28 memo written by Gleysteen to Washington, the US Ambassador said he believed the Korean military would remain “relatively unified” given the threat of North Korea and the fear of ‘alienating’ elements of Korean society. He urged the US to adopt a position of restraint, arguing that “since the 1960s, US pressures on Korea have accumulated to the point where we could face an extremely unhealthy anti-American reaction should we press too hard and too crassly to bring about structural change.”
A similar laid-back attitude was conveyed in a November 3 meeting between US officials and South Korean Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin. At the meeting, Park emphasized the need to avoid a military takeover, expressing his concern given the many factions in the military. In an attempt to reassure Park, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke said he spoke to Wickham the previous day, and that “he sensed no desire on the part of the armed forces to assume control”. Park remained wary, also doubting the ability of acting-president Choi Kyu-hah to hold things together, calling him a “relatively inactive man, who prefers to follow rather than to lead”. Park’s fears ultimately proved to be well-founded.
12/12
The coup did not come as a complete surprise to the US. Weeks before the coup, General John A. Wickham, Commander of the US Forces in Korea, UN Command, and US-ROK Combined Forces Command, received information from various sources about younger generals being unhappy about the transition process in the wake of Park’s death.
“The younger generals believed that America's policies were encouraging the liberalization of the media and the outspokenness of the opposition leaders. The officers were also openly bitter about the corruption in the government and business community, and they were restless over the prospect that the current military power structure would remain in place and inhibit their own promotion prospects,” Wickham wrote in his 1999 memoir.
Wickham notified South Korea’s Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun and Deputy Commander in Chief Ryu Byung-hyun, but both dismissed the information as being a mere rumor and took no further action. As a result, the path was clear for Chun to go ahead with the coup.
To be able to successfully carry out the coup, Chun knew he had to first deal with Chung. He planned to have him arrested the night of the coup. While Chun sent interrogators to Chung’s home that night, those loyal to Chung were invited to a dinner in western Seoul. This way, there was no one Chung could call or turn to when the officers turned up at his house. Chun’s plan worked. While Chung was being taken care of, Chun deployed multiple military units to take control of the capital.
There is much debate on whether the US could have done more to try and stop the coup or prevent it altogether. Some argue that Wickham had six full hours to take action the night of the coup but he instead urged Roh to wait until daybreak to avoid a “mistaken collision”. Even though Wickham acknowledged that “a military coup was a complete reversal of everything President Carter had tried to accomplish” he still called for “a hands-off response”.
In reality, the US was dealing with another major diplomatic issue at the same time. The Iran hostage crisis greatly impacted the way the Carter administration looked at the situation in Korea. Holbrooke made it clear to Gleysteen in a telegram sent on December 4, 1979, that “Nobody wants another Iran” and strongly discouraged any “American action which would in any way appear to unravel a situation and lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally”. In short, it seems that the Carter administration prioritized US national security interests over the democratic aspirations of the Korean population.
Aftermath
Once Defense Minister Roh gave into Chun’s coup, President-Elect Choi formally acquiesced as well and the coup was practically over by dawn. Wickham was not pleased with the situation, despite having argued for a “hands-off” approach. “The insurgent group and those who follow them have betrayed U.S. trust and jeopardized U.S. as well as ROK security interests,” Wickham reported to his superiors two weeks after the coup.
In an attempt to ease US concerns, Chun insisted that he intended to allow elections to take place and reassured US officials he had no interest in going into politics and would soon go back to being a soldier. In reality, however, holding elections at that time would have gone against the aspirations of Chun and his group as they did not support either Kim Dae-jung or Kim Young-sam, seeing them as being ill-equipped to run the country.
There was also discontent present within the military, with some officials even bringing Wickham a proposal for a counter-coup. Wickham declined the offer, however, saying that "the United States is not in the business of supporting coups and absolutely would not support any counteraction by the military faction he represented or any other faction." Wickham’s immediate priority was to ensure stability in the South to prevent any possible infiltration or sudden attack by the North. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two weeks after the Korean coup also made it more important than ever for the US to maintain stability on the southern half of the Peninsula. The US thus chose to accept the situation and focused on dealing with Chun in a way that would prevent further security threats and maintain stability.
Democracy Postponed
The consequences of the 12/12 coup were immediate and severe. Military dictatorship was prolonged and the people’s wish for democracy was suppressed in a brutal way. With the academic semester starting again in March, student protests against the Chun-led regime broke out throughout the country. Still, in a telegram sent to Washington by Gleysteen that same month, he expressed his hope that “General Chun and like-minded military officers will restrain themselves while politicians work out compromises that will allow at least some progress in the current ROK experiment in political liberalization,” signaling his ongoing optimism about the situation. But things did not turn out that way.
With his history as the head of the DSC, Chun was not one to hesitate when it came to using illegal methods to remove anything he saw as an obstacle. The full force of his ruthless ways would be on full display in May 1980 in the city of Gwangju.
Military tanks and soldiers were deployed and indiscriminately targeted students and other civilians, killing and injuring many during what came to be known as the “Gwangju Uprising”. According to official figures, 167 persons were killed and over 2,600 injured. Other estimates, however, suggest over 2,000 lost their lives.
Chun had already taken control of the KCIA in April and later became president in September in an election by the electoral council (the National Conference for Unification). Chun would serve as South Korea’s president until 1987, when he was succeeded by his close friend Roh Tae-woo. It was only after Roh’s presidency that democracy finally made its way to South Korea with the election of President Kim Young-sam.
This dark episode in South Korea’s history has left me with several questions.
What if Defense Minister Roh had taken Wickham’s warnings more seriously? Would the senior military officials have been able to conduct an investigation that would have led to the foiling of the coup plot?
What about the role of acting president Choi? What if he had taken on a more stern position and done more to block potential threats to the peaceful transition of power?
Despite the many what-ifs, history has been written and the events transpired the way they did. In the end, South Korea did become a democratic nation, but its people suffered immeasurable pain and trauma in the process.
It is this process that must never be forgotten.