The Lee government's not-so-pragmatic North Korea policy
The reality is that Lee cannot have it all, and the government must place immediate priorities over grander ambitions.
President Lee advocates for what he calls a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy, but since taking office in June, his administration has struggled to translate this vision into coherent action, especially with regards to North Korea.
Rather than pragmatism, the result has been strategic disarray. While Lee champions dialogue and exchange with Pyongyang, his defense minister boasts that South Korea’s planned nuclear submarine will keep Kim Jong Un awake at night. Cabinet ministers now routinely contradict one another in public, with the latest example being the Unification Minister’s calls to scale back joint drills, leading to further incoherence among government officials.
The South Korean leader may genuinely desire improved relations with North Korea, but achieving this goal likely requires focusing on less, not more. If he cannot reconcile these internal contradictions and align his government behind a unified strategy on the DPRK, he risks creating a paralyzed foreign policy apparatus—one unable to respond effectively during crises, vulnerable to exploitation by adversaries, and ultimately incapable of advancing any of Seoul’s long-term national interests.
Engagement vs. Military Buildup
Lee’s approach to North Korea centers on his END initiative—aimed at exchange with the North, normalization of inter-Korean relations, and denuclearization. Yet some analysts have dismissed it as “a static blueprint” rather than “a dynamic tool responsive to changing conditions.”
As part of his efforts to revive diplomacy with the North and improve inter-Korean ties, Lee has floated ambitious proposals to expand engagement across multiple sectors, including plans to install new bureaus to oversee inter-Korean economic cooperation projects and ongoing discussions on permitting South Korean tourism to North Korea. He has also vowed to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) of the ROK military within his term, a move that would likely be received favorably in Pyongyang if achieved.
Lee has also tried to position himself as a facilitator of US-DPRK dialogue. During his first summit with Trump in August, he urged the American president to play a peacemaker role on the peninsula. He repeated this appeal leading up to Trump’s visit to South Korea for the APEC summit, hoping to broker a Trump-Kim meeting. Though the encounter failed to materialize, Lee has maintained public optimism about future engagement.
The enthusiasm for engagement, however, runs headlong into a parallel track of military escalation.
US-ROK joint exercises have continued unabated—drills that Pyongyang invariably denounces as “invasion” rehearsals and “war games.” Lee has also agreed to substantially increase defense spending, with next year’s budget allocating 8.9 trillion won (up 22.3 percent from this year) to strengthen the three-axis defense structure aimed at countering DPRK threats: the Korea Air and Missile Defense system, the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation system. Defense research and development will also receive 5.9 trillion won in funding.
Perhaps most controversial is the administration’s plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine. Following his summit with Lee last month, President Trump gave his seal of approval for the project, raising questions about how this plan will affect not just inter-Korean relations, but also any prospects for the resumption of US-DPRK dialogue.
The move is also in direct conflict with the Lee administration’s stated goals of mending ties with China, since the latter is likely to see the submarine move as a major point of contention.
While implementation details remain undisclosed, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back declared last week that Kim Jong Un “will lose sleep” over the prospect of South Korea having a nuclear submarine, adding that it “would surely send chills down his spine.” Such bellicose rhetoric may project strength domestically, but it directly undermines Lee’s stated goals to improve ties with Pyongyang.
On the other hand, last week, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young suggested that scaling down joint military exercises might be necessary to create conditions for renewed US-North Korea diplomacy. The comments immediately sparked controversy, prompting the ministry’s spokesperson to clarify that Chung’s remarks should be understood “as reflecting the broader significance of the ROK-U.S. joint exercises,” offering no further details.
This is not the first time the Unification Minister’s comments have raised eyebrows. When Chung took office in July, he recommended scaling down the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise despite preparations being nearly complete, puzzling military officials. In September, he suggested halting live-fire exercises along the border. Defense Minister Ahn promptly rejected the idea, stating “We cannot unilaterally stop the exercises unless the other side [North Korea] does it first.”
The disagreements reached a crescendo that same month when Chung stated that the government should recognize “the two Koreas are separate states in reality.” National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac immediately contradicted him, insisting the government does not endorse the two-state theory. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun weighed in as well, stating he “cannot share such a position” and dismissing Chung’s remarks as “an emotional attempt to find a breakthrough.”
Most recently, the government’s decision to support a U.N. resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights violations—a reversal from the Moon Jae-in administration’s 2019-21 abstentions—has further muddied Seoul’s message to Pyongyang. A Foreign Ministry official defended the move, saying “Our government believes it is important to make tangible improvements to the human rights of North Korean people.” Yet this stance sits uneasily alongside Lee’s professed desire for warmer inter-Korean relations, given Pyongyang’s extreme sensitivity to such criticism.
Dead in the Water?
Seoul’s contradictory messaging has not gone unnoticed in Pyongyang—and the consequences could prove highly unfavorable for the ROK. These policy incoherences, combined with North Korea’s significantly strengthened position following its deepening partnership with Russia, have left Kim Jong Un even less inclined to entertain Seoul’s diplomatic overtures.
North Korean state media has seized on Lee’s mixed signals as vindication of Pyongyang’s longstanding position that engagement with the South is futile. In recent months, KCNA has accused Lee of “pretending” to seek improved relations while projecting an “amicable image,” branding him “a confrontation maniac” and referring to the ROK as “the one and only political poor in the world who has offered all its sovereignty to the U.S.”
More specifically, Kim Yo Jong, sister of leader Kim Jong Un, explicitly described the Lee government as displaying a “double character” accusing the current administration of “carrying two faces under the hood.”
Kim Jong Un himself weighed in on Lee’s contradictions during his September speech to the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly. The North Korean leader specifically highlighted Seoul’s new defense budget, noting that military spending under Lee would “far surpass” even that of the previous conservative Yoon administration.
An August KCNA article also highlighted contradictions in Lee’s Japan policy, accusing him of adopting a hardline stance during his presidential campaign only to cave to American pressure once in office. The article framed Lee’s subsequent pursuit of closer Tokyo ties as proof of “Seoul’s intention to actively participate in carrying out the Indo-Pacific strategy of the U.S”—further confirmation, in Pyongyang’s view, of the administration’s duplicity. Kim Yo Jong also drove the point home more bluntly, dismissing Lee’s North Korea policy as “little short of their predecessor’s.”
Inter-Korean relations had already deteriorated to their lowest point in years before Lee even assumed office, with Pyongyang explicitly rejecting any prospect of engagement with Seoul. Lee’s contradictory approach—rhetoric favoring dialogue coupled with accelerated military buildup and commitments toward closer alignment with Washington and Tokyo—has only reinforced Kim Jong Un’s disinterest in resuming diplomacy with the South.
Priorities over Ambition
While pragmatism is essential for South Korea given its complex geopolitical environment, the country’s foreign policy—particularly toward North Korea—requires substantial refinement to reconcile its internal contradictions. As one analyst aptly noted, policy disagreements at the highest levels of the security establishment risk slowing response times during crises or miscalculations, creating vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit.
Lee faces a genuine strategic dilemma. Maintaining robust security cooperation with Washington is necessary to achieve longer-term goals like OPCON transfer, and North Korea’s deepening military partnership with Russia means Seoul cannot afford complacency as Pyongyang’s capabilities expand rapidly. Yet the short-term imperative to strengthen defense ties with the US and Japan—ostensibly to build toward greater strategic autonomy—may paradoxically solidify the peninsula’s division rather than advance reunification, a goal still enshrined in the ROK constitution.
The uncomfortable truth is that Lee cannot have it all.
Attempting to pursue contradictory objectives simultaneously risks achieving none of them. The resurgence of factional competition within South Korea’s foreign policy elite exposes an unresolved tension between aspirations for strategic autonomy and the reality of security dependence—a divide that demands reconciliation into a coherent strategic framework.
Three priorities demand immediate attention. First, the government must speak with one voice. Constant public contradictions among senior ministers project weakness rather than resolve to both Pyongyang and the international community.
Second, Lee must acknowledge the limitations of direct inter-Korean engagement under current conditions. Rather than pursuing ambitious inter-Korean cooperation schemes, Seoul should ground its approach in achievable near-term objectives that could yield meaningful long-term dividends for both inter-Korean relations and regional stability.
Third, and most strategically, the Lee government should prioritize facilitating the resumption of US-DPRK diplomacy. If Washington and Pyongyang return to the table, opportunities for broader inter-Korean cooperation are likely to follow, eventually.
Seoul recognizes this logic, as evidenced by Lee’s consistent appeals for Trump to engage with Kim Jong Un. The question is whether the administration can align its actions with this recognition, setting aside more ambitious but currently unattainable goals to focus singularly on creating the conditions for renewed US-DPRK dialogue.