What will it take to restart inter-Korean cooperation?
South Korea is stuck between an emboldened North Korea and a distracted United States
South Korea's new President Lee Jae-myung has wasted no time pivoting his country's foreign policy toward reconciliation with North Korea. During his first summit with US President Donald Trump on Monday, Lee pressed this agenda forward, advocating for renewed talks with Pyongyang while emphasizing the American leader's unique position as "the only person who can solve this problem."
In response, Trump expressed his willingness to meet with Kim Jong Un “in the appropriate future,” even jokingly offering to set up a meeting between Kim and Lee.
While no concrete steps were agreed upon, the meeting between Lee and Trump was an overall success for the new South Korean president, who desperately wants (and needs) to restabilize inter-Korean relations after their collapse under the previous Yoon Suk-yeol administration.
It’s not an overstatement to say that the relationship between North and South Korea has not been this bad in a long, long time. Some experts even say that inter-Korean ties have been in "a state of blackout” for the past five years.
Although Trump's election earlier this year raised hopes for revived dialogue, the US president's foreign policy agenda has been consumed by conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. While Trump has expressed his interest in resuming talks with Kim Jong Un repeatedly, his actual focus has been on Kim’s new best friend: Russian President Vladimir Putin.
This may perpetuate the Korean stalemate in the short term, but successful Trump-Putin diplomacy could yield long-term benefits for US-DPRK, and ultimately inter-Korean, relations. If Trump secures a deal with Putin on Ukraine, Moscow could potentially mediate between Pyongyang and Washington, creating a positive chain reaction that reduces North Korean provocations and opens channels for inter-Korean dialogue. But can Seoul afford to wait for Trump's attention to return to Pyongyang—if it ever does?
The geopolitical landscape facing President Lee differs dramatically from that of his predecessor Moon Jae-in, who brought the two Koreas closer than they had been in years. Two developments have now raised the stakes considerably: North Korea's deepened relationship with Russia and its abandonment of unification as a goal.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine proved a godsend for Kim Jong Un amid the pandemic. Pyongyang's early support for Moscow's attack didn't go unnoticed in the Kremlin. Bilateral exchanges and economic cooperation began increasing, culminating in June 2024 when both leaders agreed to revive a mutual defense pact. While some observers dismissed this as propaganda, Kim quickly demonstrated the agreement's substance.
What seemed unthinkable just years ago became reality: North Korea deployed troops to Europe to support Russia's war against Ukraine. Real soldiers, on European soil. Here it was, on full display, what decades of sanctions had accomplished: a North Korea more powerful and emboldened than ever.
This is bad news for South Korea and for the fate of inter-Korean relations. First, it means North Korea is nowhere near as isolated as it was back in 2018, when inter-Korean ties were at high.
Beyond China's continued support, North Korea now has another major power backing it, complete with military guarantees. In any inter-Korean conflict, Pyongyang could count on military support from both Beijing and Moscow. This dramatically raises the stakes for Seoul in avoiding conflict while underscoring North Korea's reduced incentive for diplomatic engagement with the ROK. From Kim's perspective, what can Seoul offer that's valuable enough to pause his lucrative relationship with Moscow?
Beyond convincing Trump to pursue renewed talks with Pyongyang, Seoul has limited agency in this new status quo.
The second significant issue blocking the progress of inter-Korean relations is North Korea’s decision to abandon the goal of unification. Kim shocked the world with this reversal in a December 2023 speech, arguing that pursuing unification no longer seemed strategically wise. According to North Korea, the South—particularly under former President Yoon—was preparing for "unification by absorption," aiming to eliminate the Kim regime and forcibly control the northern peninsula rather than seek genuine peace. While the Yoon government spoke of peace, its real plans were far from it.
Although the Yoon administration is now gone, North Korea's constitutional change labeling the ROK as a "hostile state" remains. This makes it difficult for Pyongyang to make a sudden U-turn and declare openness to reconciliation with Seoul. Unless Kim has substantial gains to pursue—such as a Trump summit—he wouldn't risk losing face domestically and internationally.
Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his stance on Wednesday, issuing a statement criticizing the South Korean leader’s remarks made in Washington this week regarding denuclearization. According to Kim, no talks with Trump will materialize as long as Washington continues pushing for the DPRK to give up its nukes.
With trust between the two Koreas at a zero, Lee has his work cut out for him if he wants to get inter-Korean ties anywhere near where they were under Moon. While the obstacles are many, there is a bare minimum the Lee government can do to, at least, not make things worse:
Reinstate inter-Korean agreements (especially the 9.19 Inter-Korean military agreement) as a show of goodwill and to prevent a further rise in tensions.
Continue outreach to Pyongyang with the goal of restoring inter-Korean communication lines. This is a must to prevent misunderstandings and to keep heated situations at bay.
Refrain from responding in kind to North Korean provocations. It doesn’t show strength, it just makes things worse. The world knows the ROK has great military power. The DPRK does too. Sending drones across the border or shooting near the DMZ isn’t the wisest way of showing off power.
Consider decreasing, if not halting, military drills along the border with the DPRK.
Maintain close trilateral cooperation with Beijing and Tokyo (not just Japan, as was the case under Yoon). China’s power and influence vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula has been evident for thousands of years. This remains the case in 2025, especially given its continued close ties with Pyongyang.
Push, push, push for Trump to focus on the North Korea issue. South Korea’s best bet for reviving inter-Korean cooperation starts with the resumption of US-DPRK talks. Lee must get Trump’s attention back on the peninsula, despite the many other issues demanding his attention.
While the prognosis for inter-Korean relations under Lee looks rather bleak, there is still hope. The war in Ukraine could end in the latter’s favor, leaving Russia in a deeply unfavorable position. This could, in turn, weaken North Korea and make them reconsider diplomacy with the US.
Or, even if the war in Ukraine rages on, Trump may pull yet another unpredictable move and decide to suddenly shift his focus to what he may perceive as a more “solvable” problem—North Korea. He could choose to acknowledge the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state and set the foundation for renewed talks. Diplomacy could resume from there.
On the other hand, Trump may forget all about Kim and focus his entire term on Ukraine, Israel, and China.
With the unpredictability surrounding Trump and the hostility plaguing inter-Korean ties, the cards are not stacked in Lee’s favor. For now, the South Korean President will have to play the long game and focus on tension reduction, consistent communication with Washington, and setting a foundation for the reparation of nonexistent inter-Korean trust.