Where do North Korea-China relations stand after Kim’s Beijing visit?
Rather than wanting to boost ties with Beijing, Kim Jong Un's main motivation behind the visit was to reshape his international image.
North Korea and China have been experiencing somewhat of a stalemate in bilateral ties in recent years, mainly due to Pyongyang’s pivot to Moscow. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang's exchanges with Beijing have markedly decreased, making Kim Jong Un's visit to China this week his first trip to the country in six years.
Kim’s bilateral summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday marked a notable step toward repairing strained ties, with Xi emphasizing how “highly” his country values the friendship with the DPRK. Both leaders vowed to consolidate and further develop relations between their two countries “no matter how the international situation may change.”
The meeting with Xi came one day after Kim attended China's major military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Victory Day. Notably, he also used the occasion as an opportunity to meet one-on-one with Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
Although Kim's China visit helped the two countries take important steps toward repairing relations following years of deepened North Korea-Russia cooperation, Kim’s underlying reasons for the trip extended well beyond mere diplomatic reconciliation with China.
Kim's Global Statesman Strategy
Kim Jong Un had numerous opportunities to deepen ties with China over recent years, particularly in 2024, which marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. A visit to Beijing then would have demonstrated genuine commitment to strengthening their historic alliance. Instead, Kim chose to attend this specific parade in 2025—a decision driven primarily by the powerful optics it would produce.
The North Korean leader has been steadily building his international profile since his summits with Donald Trump in 2018-2019. Putin's visit to Pyongyang in 2024 to sign a mutual defense treaty further elevated Kim's status as a global player.
This week's visit to China represents yet another calculated move in Kim's strategy to transform himself from a pariah leader of a weak state into a recognized global statesman on par with major powers.
Kim's attendance at the parade this week marked his debut at a multilateral diplomatic event, further cementing this narrative. Notably, North Korean media coverage also emphasized this transformation, noting how Kim "had a picture taken with heads of state and government of different countries" and "attended the reception together with the leaders of different countries." The visuals were particularly striking: Kim seated alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and later dining with other world leaders.
Moreover, Kim's decision to leverage the Chinese celebrations as a venue for a bilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin further demonstrated his audacious approach toward Beijing and his willingness to assert North Korean autonomy on the global stage.
North Korean media's photo coverage also revealed a clear contrast in tone between Kim’s interactions with the two leaders. While images of the Kim-Xi summit conveyed a distinctly ceremonial atmosphere,— with the majority of photographs depicting the two leaders engaged in dialogue in an official conference room— photos with Putin appeared notably more intimate, including shots of the two leaders in Putin's private limousine and sharing tea in what looked like a relaxed setting.
In the end, Kim achieved what he wanted: major photo ops with Putin and Xi as well as the opportunity to showcase his participation in a multilateral diplomatic setting with over 20 world leaders.
The Widening Gap Between Beijing and Pyongyang
The cooling of China-North Korea relations has been ongoing for some years now. A review of North Korea's Korean Central News Agency articles from September 2023 to November 2024 revealed only eight diplomatic visits or exchanges between North Korea and China. In contrast, North Korea engaged in over 30 high-level exchanges with Russia in 2024 alone.
This disparity is evident in other areas as well. When North Korea relaxed its pandemic border restrictions, Russian tourists were the first allowed entry—despite Chinese tourists historically comprising the overwhelming majority of visitors to North Korea.
Perhaps most tellingly, despite 2024 being designated the "China-DPRK Friendship Year," no notable major events were held in either country to commemorate the occasion.
Several factors explain this drift. North Korea has reportedly grown frustrated with China's perceived lack of support, particularly Beijing's reluctance to provide sanctioned materials needed for domestic development projects or sensitive military technology that could enhance Pyongyang's nuclear and weapons programs. Russia, by contrast, has shown greater willingness to provide various materials and weapons regardless of international condemnation.
The two allies also disagree on other issues. While Beijing has sought to expand its influence by sharing its development model abroad, Pyongyang remains wary of excessive Chinese interference in its internal affairs. More critically, while China supports the ultimate denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Kim has made increasingly clear since the failed 2019 Hanoi summit that he has no intention of abandoning his nuclear weapons. North Korea's enhanced military cooperation with Russia only compounds Beijing's concerns, as it could lead to greater North Korean capabilities, more military provocations, and—worst of all for China—increased U.S. military presence in the region.
Although Thursday’s Kim-Xi summit had friendly overtones, no concrete commitments to expand cooperation in any specific area were made. Nevertheless, the talks represent a significant step toward resuming more regular cooperation and deepening ties.
Notably, the two sides discussed “the independent policy stands maintained by the parties and governments of the two countries in the field of external relations.” The latter is likely to have included Pyongyang’s policy stance toward Moscow.
While this represents a step in the right direction for Beijing in terms of regaining some lost ground with Pyongyang, there is no guarantee Kim will maintain the same level of eagerness to engage with China once he returns back home.
Given the high stakes involved, China now stands at a difficult crossroads. On the one hand, it seeks to project itself as a responsible global power capable of rivaling the United States. On the other hand, it highly values maintaining regional stability for its economic and security interests. The latter includes keeping North Korea in check through regular engagement and cooperation—a task made increasingly difficult due to Putin and Kim’s ever tightening bond.
Strategic Calculations and Future Prospects
Given the rapidly expanding Moscow-Pyongyang ties and China's resulting loss of influence, Beijing now finds itself faced with complex questions. Should it maintain distance from North Korea to preserve its international reputation, or should it engage more actively to regain influence from Russia? Alternatively, Beijing may be betting that Pyongyang will eventually return to China's orbit once the Ukraine conflict subsides and Russia's immediate need for North Korean support diminishes.
In the short term, however, China will likely need to adjust its North Korea strategy. Beijing could offer expanded cooperation in areas that matter to Pyongyang while minimizing damage to China's reputation—infrastructure development, agricultural modernization, transportation, pharmaceuticals, and select IT sectors like e-commerce. China might also proactively expand existing Special Economic Zones to increase trade and reduce North Korea's long-term dependence on Russian income.
During Kim's last visit to China in 2019, he expressed interest in learning from China's development experience. Beijing should capitalize on this interest sooner rather than later to regain some of the lost influence over Pyongyang.
Beyond economics, both countries share fundamental strategic interests: reducing U.S. influence on the peninsula and advancing a multipolar world order. While Russia shares these goals, its immediate focus remains more narrowly nationalist, centered on Ukraine. China, however, arguably demonstrates greater commitment to these long-term regional objectives.
History should also inform North Korea's calculations about who the more reliable partner is.
During the Korean War, it was China—not the Soviet Union—that sent ground troops to defend North Korea. China and North Korea have maintained a mutual defense treaty since 1961—China's only such agreement—while Russia only renewed its defense pact with Pyongyang in 2024 after it expired in the 1990s. This pattern reveals Russia's tendency to court North Korea when it serves Moscow's interests rather than reflecting an unconditional alliance.
While short-term gains from Russia may seem like a windfall for Kim Jong Un, this partnership won't last forever. Even if it outlives the Ukraine conflict, Russia's overall power position cannot match that of China. For these fundamental reasons, Kim would be wise to keep some of his strategic eggs in Beijing's basket.
https://thelastchord.substack.com/p/the-anthropology-of-north-korean