Can ASEAN play a greater role on the Korean Peninsula?
North Korea turns to ASEAN to diversify its partnerships, creating opportunities for the bloc to play a more active role on the Korean Peninsula.
Kim Jong Un appears to be widening North Korea’s diplomatic horizons beyond its well-known great-power allies. The latest sign of this shift came during last week’s annual military parade in Pyongyang. While Russian and Chinese delegations were expected, what stood out was the presence of high-ranking officials from several Southeast Asian nations—suggesting that Pyongyang is actively seeking to diversify its international relationships.
The North Korean leader has undeniably elevated his country’s global standing in recent years. Most recently, his appearance at Beijing’s military parade alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin last month projected an image of North Korea as anything but isolated or weak. Ties with Russia, in particular, have brought tangible benefits: arms deals, a renewed defense treaty, and North Korean troop deployments to assist in Russia’s war against Ukraine— all strengthening Pyongyang’s position regionally and globally.
Yet Kim likely recognizes the fragility of these gains. North Korea’s ties with Russia, while valuable, remain vulnerable to rapid changes, especially in the event of an end to the conflict in Ukraine.
To maintain access to diverse economic opportunities, key resources, and further enhance its position on the world stage, North Korea must diversify its international network. Southeast Asia presents an attractive option to achieve these goals.
Last week’s visits by Vietnamese, Laotian, and Indonesian delegations to Pyongyang signal growing North Korean interest in the region. This trend toward greater engagement with Southeast Asia has been building since 2023, but recent engagements suggest a more deliberate diplomatic shift.
A notable visitor last week was Indonesia’s foreign minister, whose trip marked the first of its kind in over a decade. The two countries renewed an MoU to expand cooperation in political, socio-cultural, technical, and sports sectors. While details of the agreement remain limited, the symbolism of the visit itself carried significant weight—a signal that North Korea seeks to project the image of a state with diverse international partners, beyond Russia and China.
Indonesia’s engagement is particularly significant given its historic leadership role within ASEAN. During his visit, the Indonesian foreign minister expressed interest in helping North Korea engage more substantively with ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. For Jakarta, this strategy of engagement serves its own ambitions to be seen as a middle power capable of facilitating diplomacy and contributing to regional stability. As great power competition in Asia intensifies, middle powers like Indonesia see an opportunity to establish influence over the regional order.
Beyond Indonesia, Kim held talks with Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm and signed various agreements to expand cooperation in several areas. According to the Vietnamese government, the agreements cover cooperation in defense, healthcare, culture, media, aviation, judicial assistance, investment, and double taxation avoidance. Kim also met with Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith, who was the highest-ranking official and the only head of state to attend the October 10 celebrations. Both sides agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation.
Beyond strengthening bilateral ties with North Korea, ASEAN nations could play a meaningful mediating role on the Korean Peninsula, building on their historical track record. During the Six Party Talks era in the 2000s, ASEAN member states like Malaysia and Singapore facilitated several meetings between the United States and North Korea, as well as inter-Korean meetings when representatives attended the ARF or other ASEAN-related events. While not all meetings produced tangible results, they kept communication channels open to all parties and helped sustain diplomacy..
Southeast Asian nations could contribute in several ways to diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, including by providing neutral venues for negotiations, mediating inter-Korean dialogue, and facilitating communications between the U.S. and DPRK.
ASEAN, in particular, could leverage its tradition of neutrality and consensus-building to mediate between the different sides through both formal and informal channels. By using existing platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, it could foster regular dialogue involving North Korea, the United States, and regional stakeholders, creating space for confidence-building measures and de-escalation. Humanitarian engagement and technical cooperation in areas like agriculture and public health could further serve as entry points for constructive interaction, helping to build trust and expand opportunities for diplomacy and advancing the peace process.
Several candidates stand out as potential mediators for DPRK diplomacy.
Indonesia has long upheld a firmly non-aligned foreign policy and is widely regarded as one of ASEAN’s key leaders. For example, its decision to invite Russia to the 2022 G20 Summit—despite considerable Western pressure—underscored Jakarta’s independent approach to international diplomacy. Thailand represents another option due to its existing ties with Pyongyang and its track record of having effectively mediated between diverse parties in the past. Singapore and Vietnam are also strong candidates, having hosted the US-North Korea summits in 2018 and 2019 respectively.
In fact, ASEAN’s role could become even more critical now that North Korea has enshrined South Korea as its “principal enemy” in its constitution, effectively closing the door on inter-Korean diplomacy and significantly weakening Seoul’s role as a potential mediator between Washington and Pyongyang. With Singapore and Vietnam as valuable precedents, ASEAN could once again attempt mediation between the US and North Korea.
According to Kim Beng Phar, former director of the Political and Security Community of the ASEAN Secretariat, such a move would align with Donald Trump’s stated desire to resume talks with Kim Jong Un and could serve as a vehicle for drawing Trump into deeper engagement with the Southeast Asian bloc.1
During his first term, Trump attended the 2017 ASEAN summit but skipped subsequent gatherings, raising questions about his administration’s commitment to the region. Relations with the bloc have also shown little improvement in his second term so far.
Besides the difficulties ASEAN states would face in effectively mediating between Washington and Pyongyang given Trump’s noncommittal attitude to the region, the bloc’s ties with the DPRK also face its own list of challenges. North Korea’s history of illicit operations throughout Southeast Asia, including cybercrime, oil and luxury goods smuggling, arms trafficking, and high-profile political assassinations, have particularly compounded regional concerns about deeper engagement.
Closer ties with ASEAN are unlikely to replace what Russia provides North Korea, given Southeast Asian nations’ reluctance to engage with Pyongyang in sensitive areas.
A return to nuclear testing or increased military tensions on the peninsula could further hamper engagement prospects with a bloc that also seeks to maintain strong relationships with the United States and South Korea.
Regarding the latter, the Lee Jae-myung administration would also benefit from deepening engagement with ASEAN to strengthen the bloc’s role as a constructive mediator in Korean Peninsula affairs. Expanding outreach to Southeast Asia would also align with Lee’s emphasis on pragmatic diplomacy. By encouraging ASEAN to play a more active role in dialogue involving North Korea, Seoul could help facilitate the resumption of U.S.–DPRK talks while also creating potential space for inter-Korean dialogue to restart.
North Korea’s absence from an upcoming ASEAN summit in Malaysia suggests that Pyongyang has not yet fully prioritized ties with the Southeast Asian bloc, placing its Russia diplomacy above other engagements for now. Nevertheless, North Korea is likely to gradually increase exchanges with ASEAN states as part of its long-term diplomatic strategy. Shared values between North Korea and ASEAN—including support for a multipolar world order and respect for state sovereignty—could facilitate further development of ties.
Moving forward, upcoming ASEAN chairs, particularly Singapore in 2027 and Thailand in 2028, could play a more proactive role in facilitating regional engagement with North Korea during Trump’s second term.
The challenge for ASEAN will be maintaining ties with North Korea, primarily in non-sensitive areas, while demonstrating to Washington that it can play a constructive role in helping Trump reach a deal with Pyongyang. If successful, Trump may shift his focus to the region and entertain the possibility of the bloc, or individual Southeast Asian states, playing a mediating role in U.S.-North Korea relations.
For now, Kim Jong Un’s courtship of Southeast Asia represents a calculated move—an effort to ensure that North Korea’s hard-won image as a strong global player outlasts any single partnership. Regardless of Kim Jong Un’s underlying motives, the deepening of North Korea’s engagement with Southeast Asia could create important diplomatic opportunities that the relevant parties, including Seoul and Washington, should seize.
Conversation with author on Oct. 14, 2025.